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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
52.  General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq from 10 to
13 October 2005.41 In his report to Gen Walker, he set out the heavy demands on the
UK’s Support Helicopter (SH) fleet, and continued:
“If our SH capability is inadequate, our AT fleet is worse. The air bridge to theatre is
now so fragile that sustaining an efficient R&R schedule is nigh on impossible. Quite
apart from the morale effect of inordinate delays, the difficulties with R&R are now
beginning to impact significantly on the operational effectiveness of the Division.
The situation is so bad that I am asking HQ Land to re-examine, at least in principle,
whether we might not re-adopt 4 month operational tours without R&R. Since I
suspect there will be very many reasons against this – continuity and our current
training cycle to name but two – we really need to take stock of our AT capability
in the round, especially in light of our impending commitment to Afghanistan.”
53.  Later that month, the Chiefs of Staff “noted” that the UK’s AT capability was
“unable to meet current and prospective demands”, and that General Sir Timothy
Granville-Chapman, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, would undertake a stocktake and
scope increased availability.42
54.  Gen Granville-Chapman reported to Gen Walker in December that the main
constraint on AT was the lack of DAS-equipped passenger aircraft to support current
operations.43 The decision that only DAS-equipped aircraft could carry passengers to
Iraq and Afghanistan meant that only three RAF TriStar aircraft were currently available
to support the air bridge.
55.  Gen Granville-Chapman described the work that was under way to address the
shortfall in AT availability. A further three TriStar would be fitted with DAS, and a fourth
for DAS. Those aircraft would become available between May 2006 and February 2007.
The MOD had chartered civil aircraft to shuttle between the UK and a “hub” at Al Udied
airbase in Qatar, reducing the burden on TriStar. The first charter flight had been on
6 December.
56.  The deployment of additional forces to Afghanistan in 2006 would “demand a surge
in AT requirement”. To handle that demand, the MOD was exploring the possibility of
establishing a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) for TriStar that shortened the transit time
to and from theatre.
57.  Gen Granville-Chapman also addressed a number of “more radical approaches”
including using civil aircraft fitted with DAS to fly into theatre, and procurement of
additional aircraft. On the latter, the only viable option that would make a difference to lift
capacity within two years was the early acquisition of a fifth C-17 (currently scheduled
41  Report CGS to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10-13 Oct 05’.
42  Minutes, 26 October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
43  Minute VCDS to CDS, 12 December 2005, ‘Air Transport Support to Operations’.
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