10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
317.
On the wider
question of the level of DFID advice to and support for the
military,
Sir Suma
told the Inquiry that “the military were right to expect more DFID
support than
they
perhaps got in terms of civil military advisers in the field”. Sir
Suma suggested that:
“If you
open up the operational security barrier on planning earlier, you
engage
more in
joint planning earlier, I think … the deployments would probably
have
happened
earlier.”
318.
On 1 May,
Mr O’Brien sent Mr Straw a report of his visit,
describing ORHA as “the
only game
in town”.179
Mr O’Brien
was “convinced that we either need to be fully
involved
with
supporting ORHA, or get the UN into Iraq”. The former would be
easier to achieve,
and the UK
could provide much-needed support.
319.
Mr O’Brien
highlighted the need to deploy a senior UK official to
ORHA
immediately
to take an active role in policy formation.
320.
Mr O’Brien
also highlighted the need to strengthen the IPU:
“In
tandem we need to ensure that we give the IPU the necessary
manpower
to be able to
service ORHA properly. Too much is
falling on Dominick Chilcott’s
shoulders.
He needs more support. Urgent
policy decisions need to be taken at
Ministerial
level.”
321.
In a statement
to Parliament on 30 April, Mr Hoon announced
that:
“Decisive
combat operations in Iraq are now complete, and Coalition Forces
are
increasingly
focusing upon stabilisation tasks. It will therefore be possible to
make
further
force level adjustments over the coming weeks while continuing to
meet our
responsibilities
to the Iraqi people.” 180
“While
details continue to be clarified, we envisage that by mid-May
25,000-30,000
UK Service
personnel will remain deployed in the Gulf region, continuing to
fulfil our
responsibilities
towards the Iraqi people. The planned replacement of forces is
clear
evidence of
our commitment to them.
“Our aim is
to leave an Iraq that is confident, secure and fully integrated
with
the international
community. The planning process to establish the precise
level
of the
continuing UK presence needed to achieve this aim is a dynamic one,
and
is kept
under review. We will also need to take account of the
contributions of
Coalition
partners. We will continue to withdraw assets and personnel from
the
region
where possible, but we will maintain an appropriate military
presence for
as long
as necessary.”
179
Minute
O’Brien to Straw, 1 May 1003, ‘Central Iraq Conference: Are We
Properly Engaged?’.
180
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 30 April
2003, column 15-16WS.
59