9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
577.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald recorded that Mr Blair and President Bush spent most
of their
private
meeting on 19 November discussing Iraq, drawing on Sir Jeremy’s
paper, a copy
of which
Sir Nigel had also given to Dr Rice.324
578.
At the end of
the visit, Sir Nigel met Dr Rice to discuss
follow-up.325
During
the
discussion
Dr Rice emphasised the need to “crush the insurgency hard”, mainly
through
better
intelligence.
579.
Politically,
the GC had to work better, for which the Sunnis would be key.
There
was also a
need to prioritise reconstruction projects. There was discussion
about
reuniting
the international community, and Iraq’s neighbours.
580.
Sir Nigel saw
three elements to the post-CPA civilian arrangements:
an
international
presence under some kind of UN umbrella; UK/US advisers inside the
Iraqi
ministries;
and UK/US Missions or Embassies. Sir Nigel raised the question of
contracts:
the UK had
done well in the first tranche and “hoped that DOD [Department of
Defense]
would give
us a good crack of the whip in the oil and gas area, where three UK
consortia
had real
expertise”.
581.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the approach set out in Sir Jeremy’s
paper
once again
when they met at Sedgefield at the end of the
visit.326
The meeting
was a
private
one, but Sir David Manning reported that Mr Blair had
interpreted the response
as
positive, and had stressed the importance of “effective
follow-up”.
582.
Soon after the
announcement of the 15 November Agreement, reservations
began
to be
expressed in the GC, in particular by Shia members, about its
implementation.
583.
Concerns
raised at a meeting of the nine members of the GC’s
rotating
Presidency (the
P9) on 21 November focused on the method of selecting
provincial
caucuses,
the fate of the GC post-transition, a desire to protect the
position of the
Shia majority,
a continued Coalition military presence and the lack of clarity
on
584.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Ambassador Bremer had stressed the historic
importance
of the 15
November Agreement, and the commitment of Mr Blair and
President Bush
to it.
Despite that, he was “willing to negotiate further some
details”.
585.
Despite the
problems raised, Sir Jeremy commented that they did not
appear
“insurmountable”
and no member of the GC seemed close to abandoning the
Agreement altogether.
324
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 20 November 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meetings
with President Bush 19 and
20
November’.
325
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 21 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Condi Rice,
21 November’.
326
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 21 November 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Discussion
with Bush, Sedgefield,
21 November’.
327
Telegram
278 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Constitutional
Process’.
303