The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

316. Sir Richard Dearlove told the Inquiry:

“... I don’t think the Prime Minister ever accepted the link between Iraq and terrorism.

I think it would be fair to say that the Prime Minister was very worried about the

possible conjunction of terrorism and WMD, but not specifically in relation to Iraq ...

[I] think, one could say this is one of his primary national security concerns given the

nature of Al Qaida.”148

317. The JIC assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only in response

to military action and if the existence of the regime was threatened.

318. The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding

objective” was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime”.149 The JIC judged

that, in the event of US‑led military action against Iraq, Saddam would:

“... aim to use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is likely to

weigh the costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and circumstances in

which terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions in this

field is limited.”

319. The JIC also judged that:

• Saddam’s “capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks” was “very limited”.

• Iraq’s “terrorism capability” was “inadequate to carry out chemical or biological

attacks beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons”.

320. The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s

ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.150

321. Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator in the Cabinet Office

from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that

the “threat from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the event of an

intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable”.151

322. Baroness Manningham‑Buller, the Director General of the Security Service

from 2002 to 2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service felt there

was “a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and to

British interests”.152

148 Private hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 39‑40.

149 JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’.

150 JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The Emerging view from Baghdad’.

151 Public hearing, 20 January 2010, page 37.

152 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.

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