The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
241.
Reporting
discussions in New York on 11 March on the draft resolution
and details
of a
possible “side statement”, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the
draft resolution
tabled by
the UK, US and Spain on 7 March had “no chance … of
adoption”.113
242.
When he
discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March,
Mr Blair decided
that the UK
would continue to support the US.114
243.
During Prime
Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair
stated:
“I hope
that even now those countries that are saying they would use their
veto no
matter what
the circumstances will reconsider and realise that by doing so they
put
at risk not
just the disarmament of Saddam, but the unity of the United
Nations.”115
244.
In a telephone
call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed
that the
US and UK
should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming
that he
knew it
would not happen. He would say publicly that the French had
prevented them
from
securing a resolution, so there would not be one.116
245.
Mr Blair
wanted to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process
and
the Parliamentary
vote in which France or another member of the Security Council
might
table a
resolution that attracted the support of a majority of the Council.
That could have
undermined
the UK (and US) position on its legal basis for
action.
246.
The FCO
assessed on 12 March that the votes of the three African
states were
reasonably
secure but Pakistan’s vote was not so certain. It was hoped that
the six tests
plus a
short extension of the 17 March deadline might deliver Mexico
and Chile.117
247.
The UK
circulated its draft side statement setting out the six tests to a
meeting
of Security
Council members in New York on the evening of
12 March.118
248.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Council members that the UK “non-paper”
responded
to an
approach from the “undecided six”119
looking for
a way forward, setting out six
tasks to be
achieved in a 10-day timeline.120
Sir Jeremy
reported that France, Germany
and Russia
all said that the draft resolution without operative paragraph 3
would still
authorise
force. The UK had not achieved “any kind of breakthrough” and there
were
“serious
questions about the available time”, which the US would “not help
us to satisfy”.
113
Telegram
417 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal
Iraq: Side Statement
and End
Game Options’.
114
Public
hearing, 21 January 2010, page 105.
115
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
12 March 2003, column 288.
116
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Telephone Conversation
with President
Bush, 12 March’.
117
Telegram 33
FCO London to Riyadh, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal for Heads of
Mission: Iraq:
The Endgame’.
118
Telegram
429 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Side-Statement’.
119
Angola,
Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan.
120
Telegram
428 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Circulates Side-Statement’.
602