The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
83.
Sir Michael
Jay informed Mr Straw on 16 April that he had reached
agreement with
Sir Andrew
Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary, on “the modalities for deploying
experts from
central
government, plus experts from eg the NHS and local
government”.55
84.
Sir Andrew
Turnbull sent Mr Blair a copy of Sir Michael’s minute
later the same
day,
commenting: “This is important and we will respond. But we will
need the right
collective
decisions quickly if this project is to [get] under
way.” 56
Sir Andrew
identified
two
problems:
•
It was not
clear that ORHA had reached the right conclusions about what
was
needed, or
that ORHA’s view of its role was shared by the UK.
•
The UK
needed to decide on the scale and precise roles of UK secondees
and
to reach
agreement on how to finance the activity.
85.
On 17 April,
Mr Blair agreed that the UK should “increase significantly the
level of …
political
and practical support to ORHA, including the secondment of
significant numbers
of staff in
priority areas”.57
Mr Blair
added that:
“As a
general rule, our role in humanitarian aid and in the
reconstruction of Iraq
should be
commensurate with our contribution to the military
phase.”
86.
The FCO, DFID
and the Cabinet Office were instructed to provide Mr Blair
with lists
of
secondees, their roles and dates of arrival in Iraq, by 25
April.
87.
Lt
Gen Garner, accompanied by Maj Gen Cross and other
ORHA staff, left Kuwait
to fly
into Baghdad on 21 April.58
88.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Cross commented that,
during ORHA’s time
in Kuwait,
his UK team was “strengthened a little, including a very useful
media team
provided by
Alastair Campbell [Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and
Strategy]”, but
efforts to
secure significant numbers of additional UK personnel were
“frustratingly slow”:
“I found
myself ringing around lobbying my own contacts and then asking
‘formally’
for named
individuals who I knew would add real value – usually with little
or
no
‘official’ agreement/response. I did however manage to get some
‘unofficial’
additional
military support.” 59
55
Minute Jay
to Secretary of State [FCO], 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA: UK
Support’.
56
Letter
Turnbull to Prime Minister, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Civil
Assistance to ORHA’.
57
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
58
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing Office,
2009;
Statement Cross, 2009, page 20.
59
Statement,
2009, page 18.
258