The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
818.
In September
2003, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
(DCMS)
produced a
review of its involvement in the preparations for the Iraq
conflict.292
819.
Referring to
Dr Stone’s involvement in identifying sites of cultural
heritage
significance,
the review stated that DCMS had only become aware of Dr Stone’s
work
“after the
event”. DCMS recommended that:
“In any
future such cases DCMS should be consulted and kept in the loop
since
inevitably
DCMS Ministers will be questioned subsequently about any damage
which
occurs to
cultural heritage sites.”
820.
The review
stated that “by and large” it seemed that instructions to avoid
targeting
historic
sites and buildings were heeded by the Coalition Forces. The most
important
heritage
sites were undamaged in the fighting and their special status
appeared to have
been
respected.
821.
The Inquiry
has not addressed individual targeting decisions.
822.
Robust
systems and processes were put in place for taking
targeting
decisions,
and targeting decisions were properly supported by legal
advice.
823.
Ministers
were concerned about the consequences of the air campaign
and
the
selection of targets and were proactive in their review of the
guidance.
824.
The final
versions of Directives and ROE were sent at a very late
stage
in the
preparations for military operations, but the Inquiry is satisfied
that
comprehensive
guidance was available to those taking decisions.
825.
International
humanitarian law principles and considerations were
properly
emphasised,
and explained in easily comprehensible terms.
826.
There was
consultation with archaeological experts (in
particular
Professor
Stone), but the Inquiry questions whether the approach taken by
the
MOD to
secure expert advice in advance of the conflict could be said to
constitute
“wide
consultation”. It considers that DCMS should have been asked for
advice.
292
Report
DCMS, [undated but approved on 9 September 2003], ‘Iraq: A Review
of DCMS Involvement:
April-July
2003’.
520