The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1113. On 29 October 2006, Mr Blair wrote a minute to staff in No.10 entitled ‘Iraq

Plan’.1049 On ISF development he suggested:

“Rectify any weaknesses in training, equipment, pay and capacity of the Iraqi Army.

This should be built up as a major force which everyone knows is superior to any

other force. If we need to embed more of our officers to help, we should do it. We

need to make the Iraqi MOD effective in paying soldiers.

“A plan to pay off the worst aspects of the police, slim them down and change the

command and control. All this is easier to do in the context of the growing Army

power.”

1114. In a Note to President Bush on 20 December, Mr Blair suggested three ways

in which to support Prime Minister Maliki, the first of which was to:

“… increase the speed of Iraqi Army command and control; training and equipment.

They are the one reasonably solid force structure the Iraqi Government has. All our

effort must be directed to building its capability.”1050

1115. On 6 January 2007, Prime Minister Maliki delivered what Mr Asquith described

as a “robust” speech at Iraq’s Army Day event.1051 Mr Maliki called for armed forces that

were without political bias, cohesive in the national interest and protected from political

interference and militia. Mr Maliki said:

“We will not allow anybody to be an alternative to the state, whether the militias or

anybody else, regardless of their affiliations … We will confront them firmly.”

1116. On 14 January 2007, Mr Blair met Mr Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence.1052

Mr Blair was recorded as stating that the Iraqis needed “at least one institution of power

which worked and supported the government”. His advice to the US was to place a high

value on building up Iraqi military capability.

1117. On 10 January 2007, President Bush announced a change of strategy for Iraq,

often referred to as “the Surge”.1053 This is explained in more detail in Section 9.5.

1049 Note Blair, 29 October 2006, ‘Iraq Plan’.

1050 Note Blair to Bush, 20 December 2006, ‘Note’.

1051 eGram 534/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister al‑Maliki, 7 January’.

1052 Letter Sheinwald to Forber, 15 January 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with US Defence Secretary,

14 January: Iraq and Afghanistan’.

1053 The White House archive, 10 January 2007, President’s Address to the Nation.

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