8 | The
invasion
537.
For Wasit,
Maysan and Dhi Qar provinces, the Annex stated that revenge
and
retribution
against the regime “could be high”. In Wasit it would represent “a
sizeable
internal
security issue”; in Maysan and Dhi Qar, a “short-term internal
security issue”.
The section
on Basra province stated:
“There will
be some Iranian influence as the province shares a border with Iran
…
Many tribes
have been involved in anti-regime activities and, therefore, may
be
pro-Western
… Basra should be the most stable of the provinces in terms of
threat
environment,
but the size of the population will bring its own inherent
problems.”
538.
The draft
Operational Concept listed the military tasks for Phase IV,
including:
•
maintaining
a safe and secure environment;
•
supporting
enforcement of the rule of law;
•
supporting
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction;
•
supporting
the interim civil administration;
•
helping
with the restoration of communications infrastructure;
and
•
supporting
the transformation of Iraq’s armed forces.
539.
The draft
provided broad estimates of force requirements, based on
expected
levels of
popular consent in each province.
540.
The draft
assessed the impact of factors affecting the military
tasks:
“UK
Capability … assuming
internal tensions are high, initial operations are likely
to
involve a
continuous effort to preserve and maintain a consensual framework.
This
will
potentially require a brigade level of command for each province.
At the present
scale of
effort the UK has the capacity to do this, accepting some
operational risk,
but at
prejudice to our ability to reduce force levels in the short term
…
“Iraqi
Reactions. As internal tensions subside, consent in Iraq will grow
dependent
on
confidence in the US inspired IIA [Iraqi Interim Authority],
engagement of
local Iraqi
governance and growth of HA [Humanitarian
Assistance]/immediate
reconstruction
to improve the quality of life. The Iraqi population must also
be
convinced
that our presence is temporary. There is a direct link to our exit
strategy
here; as
consent in Iraq increases, force levels decrease.
“Expanding
the Coalition. Even if a UNSCR is secured in good time, we will
enter
Phase IV
with few, if any, additional Coalition partners. Moreover IO and
NGO
support is
unlikely to be operating at full capability. This reinforces the
critical
importance
of an authorising UNSCR, allowing the wider internationalisation of
our
presence in
Iraq, and early bilateral engagement by the UK with potential
force
contributors.
In the medium term the UK may have to be prepared to bridge the
gap
in force
levels, maintaining a larger presence over a longer period of time
than we
would wish
…
97