The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
taken place
on 5 and 6 February, without injuries or damage. The FCO and DFID
were
assessing
options for a temporary reduction in staff numbers.
383.
Officials also
reported that concerns were growing for local staff, who
were
increasingly
fearful for their safety “after reports of intimidation and murders
of local staff
employed by
the UK” and increased tensions surrounding the Shia festival of
Ashura.
Mr James
Tansley, the Consul General, and others had briefed local staff and
did not
believe
there was much substance to the rumours:
“However,
DFID Basra have offered local staff the option of taking time off
if they
feel
unsafe, have advised varying routes for those who do come in and
have made
arrangements
for varying access times and gates to the compound.”
384.
On 14
February, in a paper for DOP(I), Dr Reid set out transport
options for the
British
Embassy Office Basra and the UK‑led Basra Provincial Reconstruction
Team
(PRT) after
the handover of security responsibility to Iraqi control in Maysan
and
Muthanna
provinces.269
The options
included escorts from security contractors “as now,
depending
on local threat” and a range of military options including land and
air escort.
385.
DOP(I) agreed
the approach set out in the paper.270
386.
After reviews
of personnel safety in response to an upsurge in violence in
March
2006, DFID
and the FCO concluded that there should be no reduction in staff
numbers.
387.
On 3 March,
following attacks on the British Embassy Baghdad and an upsurge
in
violence
after the bombing of the al‑Askari mosque in Samarra (see Section
9.4), DFID
officials
reviewed personnel numbers in Iraq. They recommended to
Mr Benn:
“DFID
should maintain staffing at current levels for now. The FCO
security advice
is that
there has been no significant change to our direct threat levels.
We assess
that
existing staff remain important to the success of our programmes
and that
each person
continues to deliver effective work despite restrictions on
movements.
We judge
that HMG can continue to manage known threats
robustly.” 271
388.
That advice
was restated two weeks later, in keeping with the conclusions of
an
Embassy
audit of staff and security in Baghdad and Basra.272
269
Paper
Secretary of State for Defence, 14 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Handover
of Security in Maysan and
Al Muthanna
Provinces – Paper by the Secretary of State for
Defence’.
270
Minutes, 15
February 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
271
Minute
Dinham to Private Secretary [DFID], 3 March 2005 [sic], ‘Iraq:
Security of International Staff’.
272
Minute
Dinham to Private Secretary [DFID], 15 March 2005 [sic], ‘Iraq:
Security of Staff’.
310