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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
710.  On the insurgency, Lt Gen Kiszely assessed:
“The high level of intimidation has been the insurgency’s biggest gain of the past
six months and, helped by a weak, incompetent and corrupt police force, has led
in many Sunni areas to a complete absence of law and order – in effect, anarchy.
Initially intimidation was used by the insurgency to gain control of cities and towns,
the favoured method being to capture and execute (blindfold, hands tied behind
back) anyone who stood in the way of the insurgents or who was associated with
the coalition or the government. In one city (Mosul) in one five week‑period (from
12 November to 19 December) the bodies of 220 victims executed in this way
were found, and in one single incident (Baquba, 23 October) a busload of 50 army
trainees were similarly murdered.”
711.  On INIS he wrote:
“In the past six months, INIS has been somewhat discredited in the eyes of both the
IIG and the coalition due to evidence of incompetence, corruption and penetration
by hostile agencies, both Iraqi and external … this is an area ripe for UK advice
and input.”
712.  On 15 May 2005, DCC Smith produced a report of his review of UK policing
support to the development of the IPS.649 His report described UK efforts in both
Baghdad and Basra; those recommendations relating to policing specifically in MND(SE)
are described later in this Section.
713.  DCC Smith observed a weakening of UK influence in Baghdad. Following the Luck
Review, the US was increasing resource for police training at a rate that the UK was
unable to match. He also reported that the “UK inability to ‘walk the talk’ and tendency to
write long, strategic doctrinal papers … has been interpreted by the US as typical British
procrastination”.
714.  DCC Smith recommended targeting UK resources on a number of priority areas to
increase influence at a strategic level in Baghdad. They included:
the strategic development of the IPS – “there are currently no resources, except
myself, dedicated to this key activity”;
intelligence and crime investigation, including forensics, identified as “one of the
few areas where the UK still has a foothold”, thanks, in part to the introduction of
the TIPS scheme (described below); and
continuing the Police Centre of Excellence – staffed primarily by Canadians,
this was described as “a small resource but a disproportionate influence [which]
helps to ‘fly the flag’ for policing in a land dominated by the Military”.
649  Paper Smith, 15 May 2005, ‘Next Steps on Policing – Review’.
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