The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
161.
The Red Team
assessed that the coalition’s current strategy, which focused on
the
transition
of responsibility for security to the Iraqi Government, would
enable coalition
forces to
disengage from Iraq but would leave Iraqi Security Forces that
would not to
able to
defeat the insurgency in the foreseeable future.
162.
The Red Team
proposed a new strategy based on the “ink-spot”
counter-
insurgency
model, with tighter integration of military and civilian efforts
and additional
resources
for the political, economic and governance activities. It did not
propose
additional
military resources, but considered that redeployment of some of the
existing
resources
might help achieve greater effect.
163.
The Red Team
defined the ink-spot model as:
“… the
integration of security, economic, social and political actions to
achieve
significant
local control. The concept is to introduce sufficient security
forces to
control a
defined area, use traditional counter-insurgency practices to
establish
persistent
security, exploit intelligence provided by the local population,
provide [the]
local
population with the benefits of economic development and better
governance,
and
communicate effectively with local and national
audiences.”
164.
Once an area
was secured, it could be expanded or new areas secured, so
that
the area
under control was gradually extended. These local actions would be
supported
by action
at the national level to develop an inclusive political process,
provide economic
opportunities,
and improve governance.
165.
The Report
proposed that a Joint Inter-Agency Counter-Insurgency Task
Force
should be
established to plan, co-ordinate and implement governance reform
and
economic
sector development work in support of the counter-insurgency
campaign, and
that
fully-staffed Provincial Support Teams should be established in
each ink-spot.
166.
Sir John
Sawers, FCO Director General Political at the time of the
Report’s
publication,
told the Inquiry that he would not have described the Red Team
exercise as
a major
review like the one carried out by the Baker-Hamilton Commission a
year later
(see
Section 9.5) which was “the real turning point in
strategy”.83
Rather, he
saw the
2005 Red
Team exercise as a good way of examining alternative approaches,
which
did not
lead to significant changes.
167.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told the Inquiry:
“I think
maybe what it did encapsulate was the greater readiness of the
American
system to
approach this on a counter-insurgency basis and to understand the
nature
of what we
were dealing with, to subjugate the military approach to political
ends.
And it
combined with Ambassador Khalilzad’s own outreach to the Sunni
community
and so on,
and that was in a critical moment in the run-up to the December
2005
83
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, page 41.
516