9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

668. Sir Nigel Sheinwald observed that this was a significant development and asked

the FCO and DFID to “consult more widely than their respective Secretaries of State”.

The subsequent advice to Ministers should make clear that:

“Set against the issue of not keeping people somewhere they could not operate,

there was the problem of re-entry [getting civilian staff back once they had

withdrawn] and the political or practical fall-out of the UK being driven out of the

Basra Palace by terrorists. A decision to locate our civilian presence at the airport

would represent a major failure.”

669. In relation to the formation of the new Iraqi Government, Mr Asquith briefed the Iraq

Strategy Group that “the action had shifted to Najaf”. UK input to the debate was difficult

to manage, given the lack of a direct channel to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. The Group

considered plans to send a letter from Mr Blair directly to the Grand Ayatollah.

670. A draft of that letter intended to be “a clear request to help move events forward”

was provided to Mr Blair a few days later; he signed it on 12 April.319

671. Mr Blair wrote:

“… as leader of a country which has made huge sacrifices for Iraq, I trust it

is understandable that we attach great importance to there being an effective

government of national unity.” 320

672. Mr Blair asked Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani:

“… to encourage leaders of the Shia community to recognise the need for urgent

agreement, in the next few days, on who should lead the next government.”

673. Mr Blair’s letter was sent via an intermediary, and the UK could not be sure that it

would reach him.321

674. On 13 April, Sir Nigel told Mr Hadley:

“… despite the momentum created by the Straw/Rice visit, there was a risk of things

getting bogged down again. We needed to keep up the pressure and try to use the

meeting of the Council of Representatives planned for Monday as a further stimulus

to get the Shia to make a firm decision.”322

675. Sir Nigel proposed that he and Mr Hadley should visit Baghdad together “in order

to keep up the external pressure”.

319 Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 11 April 2006, ‘Letter to Sistani’.

320 Letter Blair to Sistani, 12 April 2006, [untitled].

321 Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 11 April 2006, ‘Letter to Sistani’.

322 Letter Sheinwald to Hayes, 13 April 2006, ‘Conversation with US National Security Adviser,

13 April 2006’.

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