9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

major cross-party discussion in Basra, something that would have been inconceivable

a month earlier.

373. Maj Gen Binns also reported that he had received Lt Gen Odierno’s response to

his recommendations for PIC. Lt Gen Odierno agreed that Basra continued to make

progress and projected that Basra would transition in November, with an announcement

the preceding month. Maj Gen Binns reported:

“The sting in the tail is that this is not a recommendation; he considers that more

time is needed to further assess the impact of Mohan and Jalil (in particular the

effect the deployment of the National Police assets that Jalil has been provided

has upon the security situation), cites the uncertainty over the fate of Waili …

and has concerns regarding … reports of militia influence with the Iraqi Security

Forces (ISF).”

374. Maj Gen Binns judged:

“None of these really give me cause for concern. The ISF has no more militia

influence in Basra than anywhere else in the country … Mohan and Jalil have

already proved themselves: a week on Basra is not burning and both Mohan and

Jalil have delivered on their promises of more resources.”

375. Looking ahead to 2008, Maj Gen Binns warned:

“… we are in danger of being seduced by the current lull in attacks against MNF.

The crux is the need to move away from what is seen by the Iraqis as the offensive

capability of an occupying force, to one that is focused on Military Assistance and

Redevelopment. This progression will increase Iraqi self reliance and develop

the economic and political environment necessary to secure external commercial

investment. Seeing the political and economic Lines Of Operation undertaken by

the FCO and DFID move to the forefront, with the military footprint reducing to

provide the force protection and an enhanced BMATT [British Military Advisory and

Training Team] role. We are reasonably confident that our engagement with the Shia

polity proves this is the way ahead, although, inevitably, as this is Iraq, there will be

difficult moments.”

376. In a Current Assessment Note on Iranian support to JAM Special Groups, issued

on 13 September, a CIG assessed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds

Force (IRGC QF) was continuing to provide “training, financial support and weaponry

to Shia militants attacking Multi-National Forces (MNF) across Iraq”.186 JAM Special

Groups were receiving significant help.

186 CIG Current Assessment Note, 13 September 2007, ‘Iranian Support to Jaysh al-Mahdi

Special Groups’.

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