Executive
Summary
631.
UK policy
rested on the assumption that:
•
the US
would provide effective leadership of the immediate post‑conflict
effort
in Iraq;
•
the
conditions would soon be in place for UK military
withdrawal;
•
after a
short period of US‑led, UN‑authorised military occupation, the UN
would
administer
and provide a framework for the reconstruction of post‑conflict
Iraq;
•
substantial
international support would follow UN authorisation;
and
•
reconstruction
and the political transition to Iraqi rule would proceed in a
secure
environment.
632.
Mr Blair
was already aware that those assumptions concealed significant
risks:
•
UK
officials assessed that the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Assistance
(ORHA), the US body that would assume responsibility for
the
immediate
post‑invasion administration of Iraq, was not up to the
task.
•
Significant
differences remained between UK and US positions on UN
involvement,
and between the UK and the UN.
•
International
partners were scarce and thought to be unlikely to come
forward
in the
absence of UN authorisation.
•
UK
officials recognised that occupying forces would not remain welcome
for long
and threats
to security could quickly escalate.
633.
In the year
before the invasion, Mr Blair:
•
stated his
belief in the importance of post‑conflict planning on several
occasions,
including
in Cabinet, in Parliament and with President Bush;
•
requested
advice on aspects of post‑conflict Iraq (including for his
summer
reading
pack in July 2002, for his meeting with President Bush on 31
January
2003, and
twice in February 2003 after reading the JIC Assessment of
southern
Iraq and
the Adelphi Paper Iraq at the
Crossroads);
•
at the
meeting with Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January
2003,
asked the
MOD to consider the “big ‘what ifs’” in the specific context of
the
UK military
plan;
•
convened a
Ministerial meeting on post‑conflict issues on 6 March
2003;
•
raised
concerns about the state of planning with President Bush;
and
•
succeeded
in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s agreement
that
the UN
should be “heavily involved” in “the post‑conflict situation”, a
loose
formulation
that appeared to bridge the gap between US and UK
positions
on UN
authorisation and the post‑conflict role of the UN, but did not
address
the substantive
issues.
85