The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
590.
Ms Emma Sky,
CPA Governorate Co-ordinator in Kirkuk from June 2003
to
February
2004, told the Inquiry that she had not been engaged in development
of the
‘Vision for
Iraq’ or ‘Achieving the Vision’:
“I recall …
in September 2003 going down to Baghdad [for Mr Bremer’s
monthly
meeting of
commanders and Governorate Co-ordinators] … and there was a
CPA
strategy
that was, ‘This is what we are going to do’, but none of us had
known about
it before,
weren’t involved in the development of it.”326
591.
On 23 July,
the DFID Office in Basra produced a ‘Review of the
Humanitarian
Situation
and DFID-Funded Operations in the Lower South Area of
Iraq’.327
The
Review,
which had
been developed in consultation with CPA(South), the UK military,
Iraqi
government
bodies, UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs, described itself
as:
“…the first
comprehensive operational monitoring exercise undertaken by
DFID
in the
lower South since the conflict.”
592.
In the Review,
DFID concluded that the humanitarian phase of operations
had
rapidly
passed, although some elements of humanitarian vulnerability
remained.
Despite
continuing insecurity, a tendency by some agencies to over-assess
and
under‑implement,
an over-emphasis on Basra at the expense of other
provinces,
and poor
co-ordination within the South and between the South and Baghdad,
significant
progress
had recently been made “in providing quick-fixes to immediate
problems, and
in finally
gearing up the … reconstruction process”.
593.
DFID assessed
that the new CPA model – whereby CPA(Baghdad) would
deal
directly
with each governorate through CPA Governorate Teams (GTs), rather
than
indirectly
through CPA regional offices such as CPA(South) – was more
consistent with
Iraq’s
existing centralised model of government. CPA(South) would continue
to exist,
but as a
“regional hub” providing expertise to the four governorates, and
without explicit
authority.
DFID commented:
“Such a
dramatic change in direction typifies the uncertain and ad hoc
evolution of
the CPA …
and whilst eminently sensible, poses an entirely new set of
challenges
in terms of
establishing and staffing … and ensuring that four offices rather
than just
one receive
adequate support and guidance from Baghdad.”
594.
Security
remained the single most important factor in determining progress
on
reconstruction.
The security situation remained “at best fragile, at worst
anarchic”,
fuelled by
rising expectations, poor service provision and criminality. There
had been
some
improvements in recent weeks, including the deployment of small
numbers of
Iraqi police
onto the streets.
326
Public
hearing, 14 January 2011, page 7.
327
Paper
DFID-Basrah, 23 July 2003, ‘Review of the Humanitarian Situation
and DFID-Funded Operations
in the
Lower South Area of Iraq’.
104