6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
•
“the
requirement to achieve maximum military effect at the strategic,
operational
and
tactical levels”;
•
costs –
including a consideration of whether the relative capability of a
small
number of
more expensive enhancements was more valuable than a
larger
number of
cheaper ones; and
•
equipment
lead times – those with long lead times had been given
priority.
231.
The
difficulties of planning covertly and without wider consultation
were reiterated.
Lt Gen
Pigott said that meant that there were “a number of particularly
problematic
capabilities”
which were being addressed urgently by the MOD but “need to be
drawn
to the
attention of COS and in some cases would benefit from higher level
direction”.
Those included:
•
NBC COLPRO
– the majority of in-service equipment had been
purchased
for the
1991 Gulf Conflict but had not been fully taken into service, nor
had its
support
been fully funded “so its effectiveness for future operations” was
still to
be
determined.
•
Antitoxin –
work to address the current shortfall was “unlikely to meet
the
requirement
in less than 6 to 8 months”.
•
ECBA –
there were “about 20,000 complete sets of ECBA in-service
which
would be
“sufficient to equip the Fighting Echelon of the Land Component,
but
not the
whole Joint Force”. The time taken to produce the shortfall could
not be
determined
until industry was consulted but their current judgement was that
“it
may be very
difficult to manufacture the amount of Kevlar armour plates in
the
amount
required in time”.
232.
On visibility,
Lt Gen Pigott wrote:
“… there
will come a point where the presentational challenge will be not so
much to
ensure that
UOR work remains veiled, but rather to demonstrate that we are
taking
action to
address perceived capability shortfalls.”
233.
Lt Gen
Pigott wrote that would include issues highlighted in recent NAO
reports110
on
desertisation of armoured vehicles, Combat ID and Saif Sareea
II.
234.
When the
Chiefs of Staff discussed the list of UORs on 9 October, it
was advised
that the
Directorates of Equipment Capability (DECs) and Front Line Commands
“were
now engaged
in the staffing of UORs”.111
235.
The minutes do
not record any reference to specific UORs or equipment
capabilities
raised by Lt Gen Pigott.
110
Looking at
the NAO publications around this period, it appears that
Lt Gen Pigott was referring to one
report: the
Saif Sareea report published on 1 August 2002 that dealt with
all of the points to which he
refers and
that is detailed earlier in this Section.
111 Minutes,
9 October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
35