6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
with 60
percent of its population dependent on food aid. Thousands of
children die
needlessly
every year from lack of food and medicine. Four million people out
of a
population
of just over 20 million are living in exile.
“The
brutality of the repression – the death and torture camps, the
barbaric prisons
for
political opponents … is well documented … We take our freedom for
granted.
But imagine
what it must be like not to be able to speak or discuss or debate
or even
question
the society you live in. To see friends and family taken away and
never
daring to
complain. To suffer the humility [sic] of failing courage in face
of pitiless
terror.
That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave Saddam in place, and the
blunt truth
is that
that is how they will continue to be forced to live.
“We must
face the consequences of the actions that we advocate. For those …
who
are opposed
to this course, it means … that for the Iraqi people, whose only
true
hope lies
in the removal of Saddam, the darkness will simply close back
over.”472
1108.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair stated that the “moral case for action – never absent
from
my psyche –
provided the final part of my speech and its peroration, echoing
perhaps
subconsciously
the Chicago speech of 1999” (see Section 1.1).473
1109.
A small
number of MPs raised post-conflict issues in the debate
that
followed
Mr Blair’s speech.
1110.
In the debate
that followed Mr Blair’s speech, Mr Duncan Smith stated
that it
would be
wrong not to acknowledge the consequences of military
action:
“That is
why the Opposition have constantly urged the Government to set
out
their plans
for humanitarian assistance. Our view of the lack of preparedness
was
endorsed by
the Select Committee on International Development …
“We welcome
the written statement made last week by the Secretary of State
for
International
Development, but it did not explain what is being done to
improve
co‑ordination
between the Ministry of Defence and DFID. It did not establish
whether
DFID would
set up a mechanism to co-ordinate the UK humanitarian
response.
It did not
set out what will replace the Oil-for-Food programme … It did not
spell
out DFID’s
plan in the event of Saddam Hussein unleashing any of his arsenal
of
chemical
and biological weapons on his own people. Nor did it give details
of how
to cope
with the flight of refugees … The questions need to be
answered.”474
472
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, columns 772-773.
473
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
474
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, column 777.
509