10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

402.  The MOD provided, as part of a larger briefing pack, briefs on “Reconstruction

and the UN” and humanitarian assistance.226 The briefing on humanitarian assistance

reported that there was no humanitarian crisis in southern Iraq:

“Food, water, power and other essentials are available in towns across the UK’s

Area of Operations. Our priority is the provision of a safe and secure environment.

“UK forces will continue to deliver emergency relief where it is needed, and where

they are able to do. However, as the security situation stabilises enough for civilian aid

agencies to fully deploy, we are rightly handing some responsibilities over to them.”

403.  Mr Nicholas Cannon, Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,

passed the briefings to Mr Blair on 27 May, with the comment: “you may encounter

whinging [in Iraq] about electricity and water supplies (the military are clear that these

are already better than pre-conflict levels) and about the law and order situation”.227

404.  Mr Blair met Ambassador Bremer in Basra on 29 May.228 Ambassador Bremer

told Mr Blair that the first phase of the CPA’s work would involve demonstrating that

Saddam Hussein’s regime had definitively disappeared, by delivering improvements in

basic services (which were already mostly up to pre-conflict levels) and maintaining law

and order. The second phase would include the revival of the economy, the first stage

of establishing a free Iraqi Government, and the revival of civil society. Ambassador

Bremer’s “target economic end state” was a liberal, open market economy.

405.  Mr Blair asked about resources. Ambassador Bremer confirmed that he had no

resource constraints; the CPA had between US$4bn and US$5bn available to spend.

406.  Ambassador Bremer discussed the inadequacy of ORHA’s strategic

communications in a separate meeting with Mr Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair’s Director

of Communications and Strategy.229 Mr Campbell suggested that Mr John Buck, Head

of the UK’s Communication and Information Centre (CIC), who was due to arrive in

Iraq shortly, should take on the task of drawing up a strategic communications plan.

Ambassador Bremer agreed.

407.  Mr Buck described the situation he faced on his arrival in Iraq in his evidence

to the Inquiry:

“… there was no coherent communications operation. The US Army were doing one

thing. The British Army were doing another. The CPA were doing another. My task

largely focused on actually bringing these people together into one unit.”230

226  Letter Watkins to Cannon, 27 May 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq’ attaching Briefing, [undated],

‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq: 29 May 2003’.

227  Minute Cannon to Blair, 27 May 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq, 29 May’.

228  Letter Cannon to Owen, 29 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Bremer, 29 May’.

229  Minute Campbell to Sawers, 29 May 2003, ‘Meeting with Ambassador Bremer’.

230  Public hearing, 31 January 2011, pages 100-101.

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