15.1 | Civilian
personnel
410.
The Basra PRT
was established on 14 May 2006 (see Section 10.2).286
Its
first
Head was
Mr Mark Etherington, previously Governorate Co‑ordinator of
Wasit province.
411.
Mr Etherington
reported on 17 May that the established strength of the PRT
was
35, drawn
from the UK (FCO, DFID, MOD and the inter‑departmental
Post‑Conflict
Reconstruction
Unit (PCRU)), Denmark and the US.
412.
Mr Etherington
described the “substantial” challenges facing the PRT in
Basra.
He judged
that:
“…
we have but
one chance properly to configure and launch the PRT in order
to
maximise the
chances of its success. For this
reason we would wish to retain in
theatre for
as long as possible those resources that are already here
…
“…
The key to
the PRT’s capabilities will be the retention of a core of
long‑term
civilian
expertise in each envisaged work strand. Basra is our main
problem
and the
notion of withdrawing valuable staff as the PRT gears up to tackle
it is
counter‑intuitive.”
413.
Mr Etherington
advised that:
“The PRT,
because of its integrated civil‑military structure, has continued
to function
despite the
difficult security environment. The military component is able to
travel
when the
civilian component cannot … In the event of a protracted
deterioration
in security
terms, the PRT would also be forced to cease military
capacity‑building
efforts in
Basra; and it is probable that our Iraqi partners would be
reluctant to
continue
meeting us. In these circumstances the PRT would have to suspend
its
work
altogether until security was restored.”
414.
In August and
September 2006, the US Office of the Special Inspector
General
for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) examined whether PRTs were “fully
empowered,
staffed and
resourced to meet their mission, and to identify any other barriers
impeding
achievement
of the PRT mission” (see Section 10.2).287
415.
The SIGIR
audit, published on 29 October, concluded that the creation of 10
PRTs
and eight
satellite offices was a “noteworthy achievement”, but that many
obstacles
to
effective operation remained, including insecurity, a lag in
funding, the difficulty of
recruiting
and retaining qualified civilian personnel, and the difficulty of
integrating
civilian
and military personnel.
416.
The audit
stated that the unstable security situation in Basra meant that
PRT
members had
not been able to interact personally with their Iraqi
counterparts,
significantly
limiting the Basra PRT’s ability to achieve its mission. It
questioned
286
Minute
Etherington to [Cabinet Office junior official], 17 May 2006,
‘Basra PRT: challenges and
opportunities’.
287
Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 29 October
2006, Status of
the
Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
315