The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

by the signals of mounting US impatience and was seeking to avoid a US decision to

take action outside the UN. He had concluded that he needed to secure more time and

President Bush’s support for a second resolution. Sir David Manning had reported that

the US “was really impatient with the UN” and advised Mr Blair that “we had to fight hard

for more time, that we should persuade them [the US] it was in their own interests”.

868. Mr Blair was “clear in his own mind about policy and strategy, but worried

[President] Bush would not go for it”. Mr Blair saw his “challenge” would be:

“… persuading the US that it was in America’s interests to stay with the UN … it

would be total madness not to … but it was not going to be easy. He was aiming

to persuade Bush to wait until the middle or end of March and support a second

resolution before action.”

869. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair had been “worried” after the telephone call with

President Bush (on 30 January) because the President had “sounded much more

frustrated re the UN, definitely listening more to those saying he had to go for it”. Mr Blair

wanted to take President Bush to one side to:

“… go through the whole thing. They [the US] may not like it, but Blix was the key …

They couldn’t just bully here. Blix had to get the evidence of non‑co‑operation

and we had to get the argument round to non‑co‑operation being a breach, but

we needed two or three Blix reports to get that …”

870. Mr Campbell added that Mr Blair was:

“… really worried. He just didn’t know how [President] Bush would be … he wanted

as much time on his own as we could get, to persuade him [President Bush] that he

was more vulnerable than he thought. There was a risk of hubris. He needed world

support more than he thought, especially if something went wrong …”

871. Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that time would be needed to secure a

second resolution. Persuading France to change its position would be the key

to influencing others.

872. A clearer understanding of the UK’s legal “bottom lines” was urgently

needed to inform thinking on a second resolution.

873. A more consultative approach by the US would “work wonders”.

874. Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised early on 31 January that Dr Blix’s report to

the Security Council on 27 January had “moved the debate from Iraq’s performance

to what we should do about its non‑compliance”.284 Russia, China, Germany and

284 Telegram 174 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Where We Go From Here’.

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