12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

• communications strategy;

• mentoring; and

• a training needs assessment.

637.  In mid‑October, the UK agreed to provide funds from the GCPP to build the

capacity of the MOI, which was described as “a weak link in efforts to make the Iraqi

police effective enough to operate without MNF support”.581

638.  At the SSR meeting on 7 October, it was reported that £3.5m of GCPP funding had

been agreed for the MOI project over the next 12 to 18 months.582 The first phase would

be a scoping visit. The second phase would include two advisers until January 2005 and

then four advisers for a further year. There was potential to use civil servants from the

Home Office, such as a senior policy maker.

639.  On 19 October, a group comprising Defence Advisory Team (DAT) personnel

and a consultant were deployed to Iraq to do the initial scoping for the MOI project.583

It reported that the MOI was “unable to carry out basic management functions”.584

Basic management information, including the number of police, remained unavailable.

Decision‑making at the top of the Ministry was improving, helped significantly by US

mentors, but it was very difficult to translate decisions into action:

“Iraqi politicians currently find it hard to work with their official colleagues and

deputies, who have often been selected to achieve balance as part of a political

settlement rather than on merit or because they share a political programme. In an

unstable political and security environment, politicians are understandably reluctant

to trust people whom they do not know, and prefer to work with trustworthy family

and tribal members, regardless of formal structures or job titles.”

640.  The DAT also reported that the MOI was located outside the Green Zone585 and

that visits were currently limited to three two‑hour slots per week.

641.  The team recommended that UK support should focus on strengthening the

capabilities of a small, permanent cadre of Iraqi officials who could provide a policy

implementation capacity to any Minister within any overall structure. They also reported

that in the absence of an agreed constitution they could not make recommendations to

increase political accountability, and that they had been unable to consult civil society

on their recommendations due to the security situation and because few representative

581  Minute Jack to Private Secretary [FCO], 29 September 2004, ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool – Iraq

Strategy’; Minutes, 13 October 2004, ‘Record of Strategy Managers Meeting, 13 October 2004’.

582  Minutes, 7 October 2004, Security Sector Reform meeting.

583  Minute IPU [junior official] to PS [FCO], 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Advice to FS following Robert Davies

Paper on IPS’.

584  Report, October 2004, ‘GCPP Proposal, Iraq: Interim Security Sector Reform, Phase One Report’.

585  The ‘Green Zone’ is also described as the ‘International Zone’ and refers to the centre of the

international presence in Baghdad.

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