7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
202.
President
Putin told Mr Blair on 7 March that Russia would oppose
military action.95
203.
Mr Straw
told Mr Annan that military considerations could not be
allowed “to dictate
policy”,
but the military build-up “could not be maintained for ever”,
and:
“… the more
he had looked into the Iraq dossier [issue] the more
convinced
he had
become of the need for action. Reading the clusters document [a
report
of outstanding
issues produced by UNMOVIC on 7 March] made his hair
stand
204.
Mr Straw
set out the UK thinking on a deadline, stating that this was
“Iraq’s last
chance”,
but the objective was disarmament and, if Saddam Hussein did what
was
demanded,
“he could stay”. In those circumstances, a “permanent and
toughened
inspections
regime” would be needed, possibly “picking up some earlier ideas
for
an all‑Iraq
NFZ”.
205.
Lord Goldsmith
sent his formal advice to Mr Blair on
7 March.97
206.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush at 6pm on 7 March he
emphasised the
importance
of securing nine positive votes98
in the
Security Council for Parliamentary
approval
for UK military action.99
207.
Mr Blair
argued that while the 17 March deadline in the draft
resolution was not
sufficient
for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a judgement on
whether
Saddam
Hussein had had a change of heart. If Iraq started to co-operate,
the inspectors
could have
as much time as they liked.
208.
In a last
attempt to move opinion and secure the support of nine
members
of the
Security Council, Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose
a short extension
of the
timetable beyond 17 March and to revive the idea of producing
a “side
statement”
setting out a series of tests which would provide the basis for
a
judgement
on Saddam Hussein’s intentions.
209.
The initiative
was pursued through intensive diplomatic activity to lobby for
support
between
London and the capitals of Security Council Member
States.
95
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Putin,
7 March’.
96
Telegram
366 UKMIS New York to
FCO London, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Meeting
with
UN
Secretary-General, New York, 6 March’.
97
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
98
The number
of votes required, in the absence of a veto from one or more of the
five Permanent
Members,
for a decision to take action with the authority of the Security
Council.
99
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 7 March’.
597