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7  |  Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
202.  President Putin told Mr Blair on 7 March that Russia would oppose military action.95
203.  Mr Straw told Mr Annan that military considerations could not be allowed “to dictate
policy”, but the military build-up “could not be maintained for ever”, and:
“… the more he had looked into the Iraq dossier [issue] the more convinced
he had become of the need for action. Reading the clusters document [a report
of outstanding issues produced by UNMOVIC on 7 March] made his hair stand
on end.”96
204.  Mr Straw set out the UK thinking on a deadline, stating that this was “Iraq’s last
chance”, but the objective was disarmament and, if Saddam Hussein did what was
demanded, “he could stay”. In those circumstances, a “permanent and toughened
inspections regime” would be needed, possibly “picking up some earlier ideas for
an all‑Iraq NFZ”.
205.  Lord Goldsmith sent his formal advice to Mr Blair on 7 March.97
The end of the UN route
206.  When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush at 6pm on 7 March he emphasised the
importance of securing nine positive votes98 in the Security Council for Parliamentary
approval for UK military action.99
207.  Mr Blair argued that while the 17 March deadline in the draft resolution was not
sufficient for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a judgement on whether
Saddam Hussein had had a change of heart. If Iraq started to co-operate, the inspectors
could have as much time as they liked.
208.  In a last attempt to move opinion and secure the support of nine members
of the Security Council, Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose a short extension
of the timetable beyond 17 March and to revive the idea of producing a “side
statement” setting out a series of tests which would provide the basis for a
judgement on Saddam Hussein’s intentions.
209.  The initiative was pursued through intensive diplomatic activity to lobby for support
between London and the capitals of Security Council Member States.
95 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Putin,
7 March’.
96 Telegram 366 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with
UN Secretary-General, New York, 6 March’.
97 Minute Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’.
98 The number of votes required, in the absence of a veto from one or more of the five Permanent
Members, for a decision to take action with the authority of the Security Council.
99 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 7 March’.
597
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