The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
769.
Mr Blair
said that the memorandum put forward by France, Germany and
Russia
called “for
more time – up to the end of July at least”. But the issue was not
time but will.
The risk
was that Saddam Hussein wanted to drag the process out until the
attention of
the
international community waned.
770.
Mr Blair
emphasised that the objective was disarmament but “the nature
of
Saddam’s
regime was relevant”, first because “weapons of mass destruction in
the
hands of a
regime of this brutality” were “especially dangerous, in particular
because
Saddam has
chosen his willingness to use them”. Secondly, the innocent were
dying
in Iraq
every day.
771.
Mr Blair
concluded that the authority of the United Nations and the
international
community
was at stake. If that was not upheld, the consequences would
“stretch far
beyond
Iraq”.
772.
In response to
questions about the threat posed by Iraq, Mr Blair stated
that
that the
“whole basis of resolution 1441” was that Saddam Hussein
constituted a
threat, adding:
“Moreover,
there is a whole set of related dangers to do with unstable
states
developing
or proliferating such material and with potential links to
terrorism.
That is
why, in the end, the world has to take a very strong view of the
matter
and deal
with it.”
773.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair had called him later and
said:
“… it was
going to be really tough from now on in. The truth was we may well
have
to go
without a second UNSCR, or even without a majority on the UNSC. The
Bush
poodle
problem would get bigger … but he was adamant it was the right
thing to do,
and worth
the political consequences.”233
774.
Mr Campbell
added that “an awful lot” of Labour MPs were “committed to
rebellion”
and were
asking if Iraq was a threat “to us, and now”? Mr Blair was
“dismissive” of
Dr Blix;
he had “said his job was to set out the facts, but he now saw his
mission as
to stop
war”.
775.
In his memoir,
Mr Cook wrote that Mr Blair had been:
“… at his
most effective. He was convincing and passionate about his own
belief
in the
correctness of his course of action …
“However,
no amount of skilled presentation could conceal the immense
confusion
that we are
in over the role of the UN. Tony knows that he desperately needs
the
blessing of
the UN if he is to have any chance of carrying domestic opinion
with him,
233
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
316