Executive
Summary
alliance
founded not on emotion, but on a hard‑headed appreciation of mutual
benefit.
The
benefits do not by any means flow only in one
direction.
374.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“... I
agreed with the basic US analysis of Saddam as a threat; I thought
he was a
monster;
and to break the US partnership in such circumstances, when
America’s
key allies
were all rallying round, would in my view, then (and now) have done
major
long‑term
damage to that relationship.”
375.
The Government
was right to weigh the possible consequences for the
wider
alliance
with the US very carefully, as previous Governments have done. A
policy
of direct
opposition to the US would have done serious short‑term damage to
the
relationship,
but it is questionable whether it would have broken the
partnership.
376.
Over the past
seven decades, the UK and US have adopted differing,
and
sometimes
conflicting, positions on major issues, for example Suez, the
Vietnam War, the
Falklands,
Grenada, Bosnia, the Arab/Israel dispute and, at times, Northern
Ireland. Those
differences
did not fundamentally call into question the practice of close
co-operation,
to mutual
advantage, on the overall relationship, including defence and
intelligence.
377.
The opposition
of Germany and France to US policy in 2002 to 2003 does
not
appear to
have had a lasting impact on the relationships of those countries
with the
US, despite
the bitterness at the time.
378.
However, a
decision not to oppose does not have to be translated into
unqualified
support.
Throughout the post‑Second World War period (and, notably, during
the
wartime
alliance), the UK’s relationship with the US and the commonality of
interests
therein
have proved strong enough to bear the weight of different
approaches to
international
problems and not infrequent disagreements.
379.
Had the UK
stood by its differing position on Iraq – which was not an
opposed
position,
but one in which the UK had identified conditions seen as vital by
the UK
Government
– the Inquiry does not consider that this would have led to a
fundamental
or lasting
change in the UK’s relationship with the US.
380.
This is a
matter of judgement, and one on which Mr Blair, bearing the
responsibility
of
leadership, took a different view.
381.
The second
reason for committing unqualified support was, by standing
alongside
and taking
part in the planning, the UK would be able to influence US
policy.
382.
Mr Blair’s
stalwart support for the US after 9/11 had a significant impact in
that
country.
Mr Blair developed a close working relationship with President
Bush. He used
this to
compare notes and inject his views on the major issues of the day,
and it is clear
from the
records of the discussions that President Bush encouraged that
dialogue and
listened to
Mr Blair’s opinions.
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