3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
39.
Mr Blair
told President Chirac on 3 February that he had agreed with
President Bush
that if
Dr Blix continued to report Iraqi non-co-operation there
should be a second UN
resolution
“within weeks”.10
40.
There was
little movement on Iraq at the Franco-British Summit on 4
February.
Mr Blair
stressed the value of uniting around a second resolution to put
pressure on
Saddam
Hussein to go without war. President Chirac’s view was that the
inspectors
should be
allowed to continue their work, with more resources if they said
they needed
them. The
issue of a second resolution would not arise until the inspectors
said they
could no
longer do their work. He was concerned about the regional
implications of any
military
action and the potential consequences of trying to introduce
democracy in Iraq.11
41.
The No.10
record of the discussion reported that President Chirac doubted
that
Secretary
Powell’s presentation the following day:
“… would
contain anything new. If it did, the inspectors should verify it …
A second
resolution
would be necessary for a war, but one was not needed yet since
the
inspections
should continue. If the inspectors said they could not continue
their
work, there
could then be a second resolution. If the inspectors reported
continued
non-co-operation,
perhaps a High Commissioner for Disarmament could
visit
Baghdad,
and the inspections could be strengthened.”12
42.
President
Chirac’s public comments focused on the need to let the
inspectors
do their
job; he stated that war was the worst possible
solution.13
43.
Mr Campbell
reported that, after the meeting, Mr Blair said his strategy
was
to get
Saddam Hussein out without a war, by obtaining a second resolution
then
persuading
him to go.
44.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair had called him late on 4
February,
following
the Franco-British Summit, to say that “he could now see a way of
getting to
the same
place as Chirac”. In response to Mr Campbell’s comment
that the “best thing”
for
President Bush “was to get Saddam out without a war”, Mr Blair
had replied:
“… that was
his whole strategy, get the Blix report, then a second resolution,
then
get the
Arabs to press him to go.”14
10
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 3 February 2003, ‘Iraq and UK/France: Prime
Minister’s Phone Conversation
with
Chirac, 3 February.’
11 Telegram
058 Paris to FCO London, 5 February 2003, ‘Franco-British Summit, 4
February’.
12
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 4 February 2003, ‘UK/France Summit, 4
February: Prime Minister’s Bilateral
Meeting
with Chirac and Raffarin’.
13
Telegram 65
Paris to FCO London, 5 February 2003, ‘Franco-British Summit at Le
Touquet – Press
Reactions’.
14
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
187