The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to present
as anything other than a total withdrawal … it cd be very dangerous
for the
stability
of Iraq, & the US will, rightly, be v.
concerned.”50
154.
After visiting
Basra again in mid-May, ACM Stirrup continued to recommend
the
drawdown of
UK forces. But other contemporary evidence indicated a more
negative
picture of
circumstances in Basra than ACM Stirrup’s view that:
“… the
Iraqis are increasingly in a position to take on responsibility for
their own
problems
and therefore they might wish to look to propose the south of the
country
as a model
through which we can recommend a drawdown of
forces.”51
In 2007,
the UK reached an agreement with an individual described by the
Inquiry as
JAM1 for an
end to the targeting of UK forces by members of the JAM militia in
Basra in
exchange
for the some detainee releases.
This
agreement was a response to the dominance of JAM in Basra, which UK
military
commanders
had few remaining means to challenge, given the resources available
to
them, and
the lack of support from the Iraqi Government for Op
SALAMANCA.
The
agreement was based on the commendable intention to safeguard the
lives of
members of
the UK military as they defended, and then withdrew from, Basra
Palace.
It was
a pragmatic tactical response to immensely difficult
circumstances.
Those
circumstances were at least in part of the UK’s own making,
particularly because
of the
decisions that had been taken about the balance of resources
between Iraq and
Afghanistan.
It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an
agreement
with a
militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was
considered the best
option
available. It should have been possible for the UK to consider
increasing troop
levels in
Basra even in 2007/08.
The
agreement with JAM1 also had costs, which were little considered by
the UK.
Although it
allowed withdrawal from Basra Palace without the loss of UK life,
it did nothing
to
alleviate the impact of JAM activity on the residents of
Basra.
155.
In July 2007,
FCO and MOD officials recognised that leaving Basra Palace
would
mean moving
to PIC in fact if not in name. Mr Brown, who had become Prime
Minister
in June,
was keen that the gap between leaving the Palace and transfer to
PIC should
be as
small as possible, since UK situational awareness and ability to
conduct
operations in Basra
would be limited once the Palace was no longer in use.
156.
During a visit
to Iraq at the start of July, ACM Stirrup sought to convince
senior
US officers
that Basra was ready for transfer to PIC on the basis that it would
not
be possible
to demonstrate readiness until after the transfer had taken
place.
General David
Petraeus, Commanding General MNF-I, and Ambassador Ryan
Crocker,
50
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007,
‘Iraq’.
51
Minute
Poffley to PSSC/SofS [MOD], 17 May 2007, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 13-16
May 07’.
496