4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
568.
Addressing the
chemical and biological weapons and material Iraq might
have
produced or
obtained, which UNSCOM had been unable to account for when it left,
the
dossier
quoted the figures given to Parliament by Mr Straw on 2 May
2002, including
“over
30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological
agents.300
It
added:
“The
departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was
unable to
establish
the truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished
its ability
to monitor
and assess Iraq’s continuing attempts to reconstitute its
programmes.”
569.
In respect of
chemical and biological weapons, the Executive Summary
stated:
“As a
result of that intelligence, we judge that Iraq has:
•
continued
to produce chemical and biological agents;
•
military
plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,
including
against its
own Shia population. Some of these weapons are
deployable
within 45
minutes of an order to use them;
•
command and
control arrangements in place to use chemical and
biological
weapons.
Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There
is
intelligence
that he may have delegated this authority to his son
Qusay);
•
developed
mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier
reports
about the
mobile production of biological warfare agents;
•
pursued
illegal programmes to procure controlled material of potential
use
in the
production of chemical and biological weapons programmes
…”301
570.
In its
“main
conclusions”, the dossier
stated:
•
“Iraq has a
usable chemical and biological weapons capability … which
has
included
recent production of chemical and biological agents.”
•
“Iraq can
deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive
range
of artillery
shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic
missiles.”
•
“Iraq’s
military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons,
with
command,
control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military
are
able to
deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do
so.”302
571.
In the main
text, the dossier stated that the JIC had, in the last six
months,
“confirmed
its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare
capabilities
and
assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological
weapons”.303
300
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
16.
301
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
pages
5-6.
302
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
18.
303
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
18.
221