6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)

546.  The House of Commons Defence Committee concluded:

“Given the potential threat posed by Iraqi armed forces, sufficient chemical warfare

detection and protection were particularly important for this operation. However,

there were serious shortcomings in the supply and distribution system and the

required levels of detection and protection were not always available to everyone.

Indeed, while MOD ideally would have liked each serviceman and woman to have

had four suits available, only one suit per person was available, which MOD judged

to be sufficient for this operation. Furthermore it is essential that personnel have

confidence in the effectiveness of the equipment with which they are provided. It

was fortuitous that service personnel did not suffer as a consequence, but had the

Iraqis used chemical weapons systematically, as employed in the Iran-Iraq war, the

operational consequences would have been severe. The lack of armoured vehicle

filters seems to us to be a matter of the utmost seriousness. The lessons identified

need to be implemented as a matter of urgency to ensure that servicemen and

women serving on operations have complete and justified confidence that chemical

warfare attacks will be detected in time, that their individual protection equipment will

save their lives and that operational success will not be imperilled. This is particularly

important given that UK service personnel are more likely to be operating in such

environments in the future.”280

547.  Mr Hoon told the Inquiry: “I have to say I have not come across anything specific

to suggest that NBC protection was not available to every soldier who needed it.”281

548.  When questioned about concerns that out-of-date kit had been issued, Mr Hoon

replied:

“… I don’t recall any suggestion that any of this kit was ineffective … I don’t know

whether there was a sell-by date on the kit. There may well have been but as far as

I am aware, whenever this was tested, this equipment was fit for its purpose.”

549.  Lord Bach told the Inquiry in his witness statement that he was not aware of the

level of respirator testing that was reported to the Chiefs of Staff on 19 March 2003:

“… we did not receive information that the Chiefs of Staff Committee apparently

received on the eve of the invasion.”282

550.  When asked about the report provided to the Chiefs of Staff on 19 March 2003,

which said that only 3 percent of the land component’s respirators had been checked,

ACM Bagnall told the Inquiry:

“I do not recognise the figure of 3 percent in relation to respirator fitting. I understood

that all ground force personnel had been tested through what was described as the

280  Third Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2003-04, Lessons of Iraq, HC 57-I, para 281.

281  Public hearing, 19 January 2010, page 157.

282  Statement, 22 December 2010, page 3.

89