The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
782.
In his
statement opening the debate, Mr Straw said that the motion
meant what
it said. It
was “not an endorsement of military action” and no decision “to
deploy British
forces in
action” had “yet been taken”.238
Any
decision on military action would be put
to the
House and “subject only to the usual caveat about the safety of our
forces”. It was
“as much in
the Government’s interest as it is in the paramount interest of the
House,
that we
should do so before the start of hostilities”. The House would be
kept informed
on the
business of the Security Council and have “a full opportunity to
debate and vote
on the
outcome of proceedings on any second resolution”.
783.
Stating that
he intended to answer the “central and continuing question in
people’s
minds”,
Mr Straw said that the 13 Security Council resolutions in the
Command Paper
provided
the best answer to the question “Why Iraq?” They showed “paragraph
by
paragraph,
the exceptional danger posed by Iraq, and its continued defiance of
the
United
Nations”. Iraq had “flatly and completely” refused to comply with
resolution 1284
(1999).
Resolution 1441 gave Iraq its “final opportunity”. Iraq was the
“only country in
such
serious and multiple breach of mandatory UN
obligations”.
784.
In response to
the question “Why now?”, Mr Straw stated that Saddam
Hussein’s
aim was
that “now” should never arrive. His tactics were to “prevaricate in
the hope that
by
exploiting people’s natural anxieties” he could “string out the
process forever and
keep his
arsenal”. Since the inspectors’ return to Iraq, Saddam Hussein had
not provided
new
evidence and there were concerted Iraqi efforts to prevent
unrestricted interviews
with
scientists. The inspectors had not been able to close a single
outstanding issue.
785.
In response to
calls for “more time and more inspections”, Mr Straw said that
in
the absence
of active and immediate Iraqi co-operation, more time would not
achieve
anything of
substance. The disarmament of South Africa had taken nine
inspectors and
three
years. The “grudging concessions on process” from
Saddam Hussein had been
“secured
only because of the military build up”. Saddam Hussein “must either
embark
immediately
on voluntary and full disarmament or the Security Council must
face
up to its
responsibility to see that he is disarmed by force”.
786.
Iraq had made
“a string of cynically timed concessions” that were
“calculated
to divide
and delay”. A second resolution was needed to “bring this game to a
halt”.
If the
words “final opportunity” in resolution 1441 were to have any
meaning, it was that
Saddam
Hussein should not be allowed to “lure the international community
into endless
indecision”.
Saddam Hussein:
“… would
use a further 120 days to bring the authority of the United Nations
lower
week by
week, to tie the weapons inspectors in knots, and create further
divisions
within the
international community.”
238
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26
February 2003, columns 265-276.
318