4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
699.
In a further
email on 18 September, Mr Powell concluded:
“The threat
argument will be a major problem in the press/parliamentary assault
after
the dossier
comes out and we need to flag up the point in the preface at
publication
and during
the debate. We need to set the test for ourselves at a level
we can meet”.382
700.
There is no
indication that Mr Blair saw the emails from
Mr Powell.
701.
Commenting on
the statement that Iraq “continued to produce chemical
and
biological
weapons”, the ISC stated:
“The use of
the phrase … and the absence of detail on amounts of
agents
produced in
the executive summary and main text could give the
impression
that Saddam
was actively producing both chemical and biological
weapons
and
significant amount of agents.”383
“However
the JIC did not know what had been produced and in
what
quantities
– it had assessed, based on intelligence, that production had
taken
place. We
believe this uncertainty should have been highlighted to give
a
balanced
view of Saddam’s chemical and biological capacity.”
703.
Asked if the
information available in early 2002 showed that Saddam
Hussein’s
WMD
programmes had changed very little since 1998, and that there were
strong
caveats
about the reliability of the intelligence, Mr Blair told the
Inquiry:
“Yes, the
principal intelligence … in March 2002, was that our knowledge
was
‘sporadic’
and ‘patchy’…”384
704.
Mr Blair
added that he thought the Assessment went on to say, “but it is
clear that
Saddam
continues his programme”.
705.
Asked if it
was “wise to say that intelligence is ever beyond doubt”, and if
that was
“setting a
higher standard of proof than it might be possible to sustain”,
Mr Blair replied:
“I think
what I said …
‘What I
believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is
that
Saddam has
continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.’
“I did
believe it … and I did believe it, frankly, beyond
doubt.”385
382
Email
Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 18 September 2002, ‘Re:
Dossier’.
383
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 110.
384
Public
hearing, 2 February 2010, page 64.
385
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 80.
249