4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

23. In his memoir, Mr Straw wrote that he:

“… ran through the four countries that posed a potential threat to world peace

because of their unauthorised and highly dangerous weapons systems – North

Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq. I thought it important to raise the issue as to whether

we should contemplate not joining the US in any American military effort against

Iraq. I was concerned that the case against Iraq (why did it merit the most severe

action? what differentiated it from the other three?) had not at that stage been made:

and also about the potential consequences for Tony’s leadership, and the survival

of his government.”10

24. Sir Richard told the Inquiry that he had had “quite contentious and difficult

conversations”. He had returned from Washington “deeply concerned that there was

momentum in parts of [US] Administration”, and he had warned Mr Blair about that

momentum.11 In relation to his “alleged comment” about the intelligence being fixed

around the policy, Sir Richard told the Inquiry that was really a reference to the attempts

“to join up terrorism and Iraq” with which he “radically disagreed”.

25. Sir Richard Dearlove’s report of his meetings in Washington and the comment that

“the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” are addressed in more

detail in Section 3.3.

26. Sir David Manning asked Mr Scarlett for advice on a number of issues,

including a review of Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities and intentions.

27. It is not clear what was said about Iraq’s WMD in Mr Blair’s meeting on 23 July,

but the following day Sir David Manning explained to Mr Blair his concern that:

“… we (and I suspect the Americans) have only a hazy idea of Saddam’s retaliatory

capabilities if and when we attack Iraq. CDS [Adm Boyce] was unable to say

whether we would expect to fight in a CBW [chemical and biological warfare]

environment. The answer has a crucial bearing on the plausibility and viability of US

military plans.”12

28. Sir David wrote that he had “therefore, asked John Scarlett to review all the

intelligence on Saddam’s military capabilities and intentions, including:

• What military equipment do we think Saddam possesses, and in what state

of readiness?

• In particular, does he [Saddam Hussein] have chemical and biological agents;

and if so, can he weaponise them?

• If he can weaponise them, do we believe he can deliver them by missile

or aircraft?”

10 Straw J. Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan, 2012.

11 Private hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 34-35.

12 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 24 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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