3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
593.
Mr Straw
warned a meeting of the Security Council on 20 January
that
patience
with Iraq had nearly run out.
594.
In a joint
statement issued on 20 January, following a meeting in Baghdad to
take
stock of
inspections, UNMOVIC and the IAEA reported some progress on
detailed
issues,
including that “persons asked for interviews in private” would be
“encouraged
595.
Mr Campbell
wrote that, at the No.10 morning meeting on 20 January,
Mr Blair was
“becoming
increasingly worried about Iraq. The whole question was what we did
if and
when the US
went without the UN.”201
596.
France as
President of the Security Council had proposed a
special,
Ministerial‑level
meeting of the Council on 20 January, to discuss
counter‑terrorism.
597.
In his speech
to the Security Council, Mr Straw stated:
“… we have
to expose the connection between the terrorists who respect no
rules,
and the
states which respect no rules. It is the leaders of rogue states
who set the
example:
brutalise their people; celebrate violence; provide a haven for
terrorists
to operate;
and, worse than that, through their chemical and biological weapons
…
provide a
tempting arsenal for terrorists to use …
“So …
action to stop rogue states’ proliferation is as urgent as action
to stop
terrorism …
wherever we can, we should use diplomatic means to get
proliferators
to comply
as we are with North Korea … But there comes a moment when
our
patience
must run out.
“We are
near that point with Iraq … so the moment of choice for Iraq is
close.
He [Saddam
Hussein] must either resolve this crisis peacefully, by the full
and
active
compliance with his Security Council obligations and full
co‑operation with
inspectors,
or face the ‘serious consequences’ – the use of force – which
this
Council
warned would follow when it passed [resolution]
1441.”202
598.
Mr McDonald
reported that Mr Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister,
had
told
Mr Straw in the margins of the discussion that Germany would
not vote for a second
resolution,
even if there was clear evidence of a material breach; and that
there were
no
circumstances in which Germany would be involved in military
action.203
Asked if
he
really
meant no circumstances, such as “some flagrant breach, a large
find, the murder
of an
inspector”, Mr Fischer replied that that “was different”, and
Germany “might” vote
for a
second resolution.
200
UNMOVIC,
Joint
Statement, Baghdad, 20 January 2003.
201
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
202
Speech,
Straw to the UN, 20 January 2003, ‘Vindicating the UN’s founding
ideal’ [FCO, Iraq,
Cm
5769,
25 February
2003].
203
Minute
McDonald to Gray, 21 January 2003, ‘UN Security Council
Meeting/Iraq’.
105