4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

• T  o obtain and provide information to United Nations inspectors about

the likely locations of weapons and programmes which contravened the

terms of United Nations Security Council resolutions.”278

667.  From October 2002 onwards, the JIC focused on two main themes:

• Iraq’s attitude to the return of the inspectors and, from 8 November, its

compliance with the specific obligations imposed by resolution 1441.

• Iraq’s options, diplomatic and military, including the possible use

of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles against

Coalition Forces or countries in the region in either pre-emptive attacks

or in response to a military attack.

668.  The way in which the assessments and intelligence on Iraq’s WMD were used

in pursuit of the UK’s strategy towards Iraq is considered in Section 3.

669.  In its Assessment of 18 December, the JIC made the judgements in the

UK Government September dossier part of the test for Iraq.

670.  The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions relied heavily on

Iraq’s past behaviour being a reliable indicator of its current and future actions.

671.  There was no consideration of whether, faced with the prospect of a US-led

invasion, Saddam Hussein had taken a different position.

672.  Mr Scarlett wrote on 30 January 2003 that Saddam Hussein had “followed

essentially the same strategy and tactics as during the 1990s”.279

673.  Mr Scarlett told No.10 on 17 March that the JIC was clear that Iraq possessed

chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them, and the capacity to

produce them.280 He stated that the starting point for those judgements was the

“knowledge of Iraq’s past WMD programmes” which demonstrated “not only

large‑scale possession of these weapons, and the readiness to use them, but

also Saddam’s determination to retain WMD”.

674.  The absence of evidence of proscribed programmes and materials relating

to the production or delivery of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was

attributed to Iraq’s ability to conceal its activities and deceive the inspectors and

the difficulties which it had been anticipated the inspectors would encounter.

278  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 431.

279  Minute Scarlett to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: JIC Assessment and Personal Observations’.

280  Minute Scarlett to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Evidence of Possession’.

411