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4.4  |  The search for WMD
211.  Mr Watkins reported that the US was planning to expand and better co-ordinate
the existing Coalition effort by bringing together current WMD and other post-conflict
activities under the ISG. The draft mission for the ISG was to:
“Organise, direct and apply capabilities and expertise in Iraq to discover, take
custody of, exploit, disseminate and disable, eliminate information and material on
individuals, records, NBC samples, weapons systems, materials, facilities, networks,
and operations relative to:
Terrorism
Iraqi intelligence
WMD (Main Effort)
Individuals associated with the Iraqi regime/leadership with WMD
Individuals detained by the Iraqi regime
War crimes and crimes against humanity.”
212.  Mr Watkins reported that the UK would be providing the Deputy Commander,
Brigadier John Deverell, who would “be running all ISG operations, with Maj Gen Dayton
addressing external and higher level ISG issues”. The UK would:
“… also assign to the ISG the UK WMD related units already in theatre or about to
arrive, including:
The DIS Battlefield Intelligence Recovery Team
The Joint Forces Interrogation Team
7630 (HUMINT) Sqn RauxAF [Royal Auxiliary Air Force]
A Document Exploitation Team.
“We are also investigating the most effective use of the joint NBC Regiment and
other assets in theatre … DIS liaison staff in Washington will be reinforced to
support ISG work, with a view to providing a UK presence in the ISG Fusion Cell in
Washington. The DIS is also providing individual reinforcements to ISG in theatre.
“We are also actively recruiting a cadre of UK ex-UNSCOM and ex-UNMOVIC
inspectors, and others …”
213.  Mr Watkins wrote that the UK needed to keep up the pressure on the US to
ensure WMD detection received the attention it deserved. There also needed to be
more work on public handling. There had been problems with US briefings in theatre
and in Washington not being properly cleared with the UK. The UK had taken steps to
ensure co-ordination was as good as possible. There was also a more general need for
Whitehall to develop a “coherent and proactive PR strategy” for the ISG’s work.
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