6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
357.
On 9 July,
Sir Christopher Meyer reported speculation in the US media and
a
number of
recent discussions in Washington.167
358.
In a press
conference on 8 July, President Bush had not attempted to
challenge
the
veracity of a story about leaked military plans.
Sir Christopher’s contacts suggested
that the
aim was to have a reworked military plan on President Bush’s desk
before he
went on
holiday in August.
359.
In
mid‑July, the MOD still had only scant information about US
military plans
and the
Chiefs of Staff identified a number of areas of concern which
needed to
be addressed.
360.
Political
guidance was needed on how to implement the UK’s intent
and
convey that
intent to the US.
361.
The SPG had
pointed out that, once military forces were deployed, the
US
would have
to see its policy through to a successful conclusion.
362.
But that
point does not seem to have been pursued in relation to what
that
might mean
for UK policy.
363.
Lt Gen Pigott
issued ‘Initial Planning Guidance for Possible Military
Operations
in Iraq’ to
Lt Gen Reith, AM French, the Director Special Forces, Air
Commodore
Mike Heath
(Director Targeting and Information Operations), and
Brigadier
Andrew Stewart,
the Army’s Director of Overseas Military Activity, on 8
July.168
The
guidance
considered the preparation of military strategic options ranging
from regional
influence
to large scale war‑fighting and assessed the CENTCOM
plan.
364.
Lt Gen Pigott
made clear that the planning and contingency work conducted
so
far had not
been subject to legal scrutiny. He also asked for “actionable
intelligence” on
WMD and an
understanding of Saddam Hussein’s options and the regime’s fault
lines
and
fragility.
365.
A revised
version of the SPG paper, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’,
was
produced on
11 July for a “Strategic Think Tank” on Iraq the following
week.169
366.
Much of the
thinking underpinning the paper was unchanged but there
were
some significant
additions, including:
•
The US was
aware of the dangers of failure and was planning for
the
“worst case”.
167
Telegram
926 Washington to FCO London, 9 July 2002, ‘Iraq: US
views’.
168
Minute
DCDS(C) to Various, 8 July 2002, ‘Initial Planning Guidance for
Possible Military Operations
in Iraq’.
169
Paper
[SPG], 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
229