The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
so that
your advice could be factored into the development of different
options. It
would not
be helpful for you, or Ministerial colleagues, if you were
presented at the
last moment
with a request for a ‘yes or no’ answer. You [were] always
available to
discuss
these matters with Ministerial colleagues.” 128
348.
Mr Berman also
wrote that he had “recalled (and Mr McKane agreed) that the
legal
basis for
the use of force in 1998 had been very difficult and contentious.
Any proposed
recourse to
the inherent right of self-defence would also be far from
straightforward.”
349.
Mr Berman had
contacted Mr Michael Wood, the FCO Legal Adviser, who told
him
that a
policy paper had already been submitted to No.10 but he (Mr Wood)
could not
send Mr
Berman a copy. Mr Wood had provided a copy of the FCO paper (‘Iraq:
Legal
background’).
Mr Berman had “underlined to Mr Wood the importance of ensuring
that
LSLO [Legal
Secretariat to the Law Officers] was fully kept in … the loop – in
relation to
the
development of policy as well as any comments on the legal
issues”.
350.
The FCO
briefing for Mr Blair’s meeting with Vice President
Cheney
suggested
that:
•
Mr Blair
should state that the UK supported the US objective of
regime
change in
Iraq.
•
It would be
important to alert a sceptical world to the threat posed by
Iraq.
351.
The FCO
briefing for Mr Blair’s meeting with Vice President Cheney covered
a
range of
issues but Iraq was identified as:
“… the main
issue, including for the media given speculation that the US are
moving
towards
early decisions on military action … This will … be an important
opportunity
… to get a
feel for where the debate in Washington stands and what options
are
352.
The FCO
suggested that the key messages for Mr Cheney on Iraq
were:
•
“In
complete agreement on objective. World a better place without
Saddam
in power.
Need to ratchet up the pressure on Iraq.”
•
“Containment
policy has had some success … Climate post 11
September
could provide
opportunities for enhanced containment, but cannot bring
about
regime
change.”
128
Minute
Berman to Attorney General, 11 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
129
Letter
McDonald to Rycroft, 8 March 2002, ‘US Vice President’s Call on the
Prime Minister, 11 March’.
448