9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
unwillingness
of the local population to tolerate AQ activity and their desire to
co‑operate
with CF
[coalition forces].”
830.
On relations
with the Iraqi Government, he commented:
“… my sense
is that the Prime Minister [Maliki] and the Iraqi Government
Ministers,
while
continuing to listen to advice, are less inclined to be dictated to
by what we the
coalition
want. Our contributions to the debate are embraced when they
coincide
with what
they, the Iraqis, have in mind, whilst if our advice challenges
what they
have in
mind (and is probably therefore not shared with us) then it becomes
a much
more
difficult issue to push through. To some extent it was ever thus,
but 2007 is
becoming a
year of hard bargaining and tense negotiation, albeit more in a
spirit of
partnership
than the one‑sided (US) affair it was in 2006.”
831.
On
reconciliation and outreach, Lt Gen Lamb reported that the newly
enlarged
Engagement
Cell was being much appreciated by the US and that “another small
UK
inspired
piece of thinking and work application” was emerging in the form of
the “Energy
Fusion
Cell”, aimed at co‑ordinating the various Iraqi ministries
responsible for energy.
832.
On 14 May, a
letter on JAM and the prospects for outreach was provided
to
Mr Dowse
at his request.453
It
stated:
“Despite
the ability to mobilise mass demonstrations … JAM and OMS are
in
disarray,
with no unified political or military leadership. This has been
exacerbated
by Muqtada
al‑Sadr’s extended stay in Iran and the arrest of al‑Khaz’ali … But
the
divisions
already existed.”
833.
The letter
said that JAM activities fell into four categories, all of which
were
overwritten
by complex regional and tribal allegiances between
individuals:
•
Iranian‑sponsored
secret cells;
•
the
mainstream organisation of OMS and JAM;
•
criminal
elements in Sadr City; and
•
the
demonstrators and occasional fighters who respond on an emotional
level
to the
JAM call to arms.
834.
As a result,
“no one figure, including probably Muqtada al‑Sadr himself, is
capable
of
delivering JAM as a movement but a range of people have influence
over parts of
JAM”. The
letter continued:
“In Baghdad
in recent weeks, JAM militiamen have begun to reappear on
the
streets but
apparently remain under orders (it is not clear whose) not to
engage in
attacks …
In Basra JAM command and control is also unclear but the result is
the
opposite to
the relative lull in Baghdad … Some senior members of the Sadr
trend
453
Letter
junior official specialising in the Middle East to Dowse, 14 May
2007, ‘Jaysh al‑Mahdi and the
Prospects
for Outreach’.
155