6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
“Construction
of entirely new roads and buildings may in some
circumstances
be
permissible – where this is necessary for the relief effort or, for
example for
maintaining
security or public order. As you know, the scope for action on the
other
issues … is
limited. Any action going beyond these limits would require
Security
Council
authorisation.”
1043.
Mr Llewellyn
offered further observations on 18 March, in which he
emphasised
that
“sweeping” institutional and personnel changes would not be
permitted.444
1044.
The FCO
informed No.10 that the UK continued to make progress
reconciling
UK and US positions on the post-conflict role of the UN,
but
significant
differences remained.
1045.
The US
accepted the need to internationalise Phase IV activity but
wanted
to keep the
“whip hand”, an approach that was “almost certainly not negotiable
in
the UN
Security Council”.
1046.
The FCO
advised that the US must be held to the commitments
made
at the
Azores Summit. No Security Council authorisation would mean no
wide
international
effort and the likelihood of a much less consensual environment
in
which to
operate.
1047.
As “best
friends” of the US, the UK should continue to offer advice on
what
would and
would not work.
1048.
On 17 March,
the FCO informed Sir David Manning that the UK continued
“to
make some
good progress” in bringing together UK and US positions on the
UN.445
The US
now accepted that:
•
“The Phase
IV reform and reconstruction task is much too big for the
US/UK
to go it
alone. All the traditional nation-builders will be required – the
IFIs, the
UN, NGOs,
and the big bilateral donors (eg the EU and Japan). We need
wide
international
support to allow us an exit strategy.”
•
Security
Council authorisation would make it easier to secure
international
support.
•
The
international community would need a new Security Council mandate
to
have a
legal basis for a reform programme which would go beyond what
was
allowed by
the laws of armed conflict.
444
Minute
Llewellyn to IPU [junior official], 18 March 2003, ‘Potential
Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Activities
in Iraq’.
445
Letter Owen
to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV (Day-After): US/UK
Discussions on an
Authorising
UNSCR’.
499