The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
10 percent
threat to the Iraqi end state. If we ever reached the stage when
MND(SE)
were
restricted to operations in pursuit of our own force protection, we
would need
seriously
to question our rationale for being here.”357
676.
The Mayor of
Sadr City, Sheik Raheem Al Daraji, and his friend
Mr Mohammed
Mutashar,
were attacked on 15 March.358
The Mayor
escaped with minor injuries but his
friend was
killed.
677.
Lt Gen Lamb
observed that the anger the attack generated within parts of
the
community
had opened an existing rift within JAM/Office of the Martyr Sadr
and the
‘city’ and
created a greater willingness for at least parts of an emerging
leadership to
co‑operate
with MNF‑I.
678.
Mr Asquith
reported on 15 March that there was growing speculation in
Baghdad
about the
possibility of a coup against Prime Minister Maliki led by Dr
Allawi, with one
SCIRI
cleric claiming that the UK was promoting such a
coup.359
Mr Asquith
wrote:
“Allawi as
I suspected has moved into opposition mode. He aims to amass
sufficient
support to
force and win a vote of no confidence and assume the Premiership
…
The
constituent elements of the UIA … are testing where separate
alliances might
be made in
case the Baghdad security plan founders …
“My message
(private and public) has been to reiterate our solid support for
Maliki
in his
pursuit of establishing the conditions on the ground for greater
stability; to
encourage
those working so hard to build a rival to the current government
to
direct
their efforts instead to contributing to the success of the Baghdad
Plan by
reassuring
Maliki of their support; and to focus them on how they might
improve the
effectiveness
of the government with Maliki as PM …
“Given
their number, disparity of views and unpredictability, the Sadrists
remain a
key element
in the political and security reckoning. Their quiescence in
Baghdad
is largely
responsible for the positive early indicators in FAQ [Fardh
al‑Qanoon].
Essentially
Arab (albeit Shia) nationalist in outlook, with non‑Islamist and
even
politically
secular strands, there are sections prepared to work with coalition
forces –
and Sunnis
– if they see it to their advantage … This is the moment to bring
in the
moderates,
rather than to take on the whole movement which would risk
provoking
a schism
and the emergence of a radical Taliban‑like wing.”
679.
In a telegram
on 16 March, Mr Asquith assessed that the Baghdad Security
Plan
was
continuing to make progress:
“Overall,
the picture remains positive. Maliki … continues to impress – out
in
front and
even‑handed. But, whenever he has an opportunity, General
Petraeus
357
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 15 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 15
March 2007’.
358
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 18 March 2007, ‘SBMRI‑I Weekly Report (248) 18 Mar
07’.
359
eGram
10744/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
126