The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(ii)
concerns by them of some lack of co‑operation, and in respect of
some
of their
finds, but in neither case adding up to a casus belli to satisfy
a
majority on
the Security Council.”
392.
Mr Straw
suggested the UK’s messages should be:
“•
to
emphasise that our preferred strategy continues to be …
disarmament
by peaceful
means, through the UN system;
•
the 27
January meeting is not and never has been a decision deadline
…
•
whatever
the inspectors say to the 27 January meeting, decisions,
particularly
on military
action, would not be taken then.”
393.
Mr Straw
warned Mr Blair that the UK would be “faced with the argument
that the
finds prove
that inspection is working: we will be told to let them continue
and destroy
what they
find rather than going to war”.
394.
Mr Straw
suggested that the UK needed “to discuss very privately with
the
Americans
over the next few weeks our strategy if inspections produce no
early and
large
smoking gun”. The purpose would be to explore whether the US could
or would
maintain
the position of continuing inspections and a military build‑up at a
high state
of readiness
“for weeks or even months”.
395.
Mr Straw
stated that there were signs that President Bush recognised that
going
to war
“without a publicly convincing trigger, and without a second UNSCR,
could well
be
politically worse for him … as well as acutely difficult for us”.
Secretary Powell had
told
Mr Straw that “if there was an insufficient case for a second
resolution, there would
equally be
an insufficient case for the US to go unilateral”.
396.
Mr Straw
offered to discuss the issues with Mr Blair.
397.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Straw had:
“… called
me a couple of times over the holiday and emphasised the
importance
of TB
[Mr Blair] not positioning himself so that no war looked like
failure.”138
398.
Mr Straw
told the Inquiry that in “very early January [2003] he had bumped
in to
two
journalists” who had asked about the odds of avoiding war, and that
he had replied
“60/40”.139
That reply
then “found its way into the newspapers”. Mr Straw stated
that
he had
formed that “provisional judgement” from his own reading of the
Iraqi regime’s
behaviour:
“… by its
own terms it acted with some rationality. I could not believe that,
faced with
the near
certainty of military action if it failed to comply with 1441, the
regime could
138
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
139
Statement,
January 2010, paragraphs 34‑35.
72