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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
been going on for some time”.141 But he did accept that the IPU could have been
set up sooner:
“… one of the lessons is obviously you can’t begin this sort of thinking too early,
and although we did begin serious thinking about the day after in the preceding
October … we could have created the IPU earlier. We could have had a greater
sense of the reality of what we were doing. I think also, because it was contingency
planning, because right up until the last moment we didn’t know for sure that we
were going to be involved in the military action, that maybe psychologically had an
effect on us …”142
243.  On the relationship with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), Mr Chilcott said that: “ORHA in some ways weren’t really our counterparts
because they were the sort of operational implementers … as well as the drawers up of
the plan, whereas we … were writing policy papers and briefing and lines to take.”143
244.  Mr Bowen told the Inquiry one reason for establishing the IPU was to set up a
counterpart to ORHA: “as soon as we … understood where the centre of gravity was in
America … we set up … a centre of gravity that could interact with it”. At this early stage
in the relationship, before misgivings about ORHA had begun to emerge in Whitehall,
that seemed still to be the intention.
Decision-making machinery post-invasion
The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
245.  On 27 March, Mr Bowen sent Sir Andrew Turnbull a draft minute addressed
to Mr Blair, recommending the creation of an “Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
Reconstruction” chaired by Mr Straw.144 Mr Bowen advised that he had opted for an ad
hoc group because it was “inherently more flexible and less ponderous than a formal
sub-group of DOP”.
246.  Sir Andrew Turnbull wrote to Sir Kevin Tebbit on 31 March, seeking his and, among
others, Sir David Manning’s agreement to a slightly revised version of the draft minute
produced by Mr Bowen on 27 March.145 Sir Andrew advised that the revised draft had
already been agreed with Sir Michael Jay and Mr Chakrabarti.
141  Public hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 17-18.
142  Public hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 47-48.
143  Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 20.
144  Minute Bowen to Turnbull, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction’ attaching draft minute Turnbull
to Prime Minister, [undated], ‘Iraq Reconstruction’.
145  Letter Turnbull to Tebbit, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Rehabilitation’ attaching draft minute Turnbull
to Prime Minister, [undated], ‘Iraq: Rehabilitation’.
306
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