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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
1046.  PJHQ was given responsibility for Phase IV planning. PJHQ officials
advised that:
If the UK were to take on the first Phase IV AOR in southern Iraq, it would
effectively be “setting the standard” for the rest of Phase IV.
PJHQ would need more support from other government departments if
there was to be a joined-up approach to UK post-conflict planning.
1047.  Section 6.2 describes how, from the end of December 2002, the focus of UK
military planning shifted from northern to southern Iraq.
1048.  On 30 December 2002, Adm Boyce issued the ‘CDS Planning and Preparation
Directive for Operation TELIC’,502 authorising the military preparations needed for
Coalition operations in Iraq.503
1049.  The Directive, which included little material linked explicitly to the post-conflict
phase of operations (Phase IV), stated:
“Delivering HMG’s declared end state is likely to require UK engagement in follow-
on operations but the possible scale and duration of ‘aftermath operations’ are
uncertain and are in urgent need of clarification from US planners at all levels.”
1050.  Instructions to Lt Gen Reith included:
to seek to influence US planning, as directed by MOD; and
to prepare plans for humanitarian assistance in theatre, should it become
necessary.
1051.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, Chief of Defence Logistics, was instructed
to: “Be prepared to sustain follow-on forces at up to the medium scale of effort on land
and air, and at small scale in the maritime environment for, initially, up to six months.”
1052.  The Planning and Preparation Directive was superseded by a first version of the
Execute Directive on 4 March 2003 (see Section 6.5).
1053.  On 5 January, Brigadier Albert Whitley, who had been deployed as Senior
British Land Adviser (SBLA) to US Lieutenant General David McKiernan’s Coalition
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) HQ in Kuwait in early November 2002,504
prepared a paper for PJHQ on “the imperatives for timely decision making for the
commitment of UK Land Forces” to the US Operational Plan.505 The paper is described
in more detail in Section 6.2.
502  Operation TELIC was the codename for the involvement of UK Armed Forces in the military campaign
to remove the threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
503  Paper CDS, 30 December 2002, ‘CDS Planning and Preparation Directive for Operation TELIC’.
504  Statement Whitley, 25 January 2011, page 3.
505  Paper SBLA, 5 January 2003, ‘Decision Imperatives’.
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