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8  |  The invasion
261.  Mr Hoon’s Assistant Private Secretary wrote on 28 March that Mr Hoon had “noted”
the advice from the PJHQ about the planning for Basra “and the continuing imperative
attached to operations in respect of Baghdad”.158 He was:
“… keen that we do not adopt a static approach to Basra, but instead actively exploit
the physical and information opportunities which are presented …
“Mr Hoon also wonders whether the balance would be changed if circumstances
dictated that the attack on Baghdad were delayed, say until after the arrival of
4th Infantry Division.”
262.  The Assistant Private Secretary also requested further advice for Mr Hoon on the
actions being taken by UK forces around Basra.
263.  Operations around Basra were discussed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on the
morning of 28 March.159 An air strike had been carried out on the Iraqi Intelligence HQ in
Basra. Separately, troops from the Black Watch had conducted a patrol 7km into Basra.
Operations were focused on “driving a wedge between the Iraqi forces and the wavering
civilian population”.
264.  The Chiefs of Staff were told that:
16 Air Assault Brigade had been dispatched to secure Route 6, which ran north
from Basra, through al-Amara and al-Kut, to Baghdad.
The al-Faw Peninsula was “thought to be as secure as possible … Operations
had therefore transitioned to PSO – [peace support operations] type activity,
although the local population remained very cautious.”
3 Commando Brigade continued to destroy enemy assets on the peninsula.
CENTCOM guidance had been changed “to include destruction of Regime
loyalists and symbols … to demonstrate commitment to the Iraqi people …”
265.  The MOD sought to counter the media focus on the perceived problems
of the campaign.
266.  Speaking to the press on 28 March, Lieutenant General William Wallace,
Commander of US V Corps, said that it was beginning to look as if the removal of the
Iraqi Government was likely to take longer than originally thought.160 Lt Gen Wallace
told reporters:
“The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against,
because of these paramilitary forces … We knew they were here, but we did not
know how they would fight.”
158  Minute Williams to PJHQ Dep Hd Pol/Ops(ME), 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Basrah – Coalition
Campaign Strategy’.
159  Minutes, 28 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
160  New York Times, 28 March 2003, A Nation at War: In the Field – V Corps Commander: A Gulf
Commander Sees a Longer Road.
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