8 | The
invasion
261.
Mr Hoon’s
Assistant Private Secretary wrote on 28 March that Mr Hoon had
“noted”
the advice
from the PJHQ about the planning for Basra “and the continuing
imperative
attached to
operations in respect of Baghdad”.158
He
was:
“… keen
that we do not adopt a static approach to Basra, but instead
actively exploit
the
physical and information opportunities which are presented
…
“Mr Hoon
also wonders whether the balance would be changed if
circumstances
dictated
that the attack on Baghdad were delayed, say until after the
arrival of
4th Infantry
Division.”
262.
The Assistant
Private Secretary also requested further advice for Mr Hoon on
the
actions
being taken by UK forces around Basra.
263.
Operations
around Basra were discussed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on
the
morning of
28 March.159
An air
strike had been carried out on the Iraqi Intelligence HQ
in
Basra.
Separately, troops from the Black Watch had conducted a patrol 7km
into Basra.
Operations
were focused on “driving a wedge between the Iraqi forces and the
wavering
civilian
population”.
264.
The Chiefs of
Staff were told that:
•
16 Air
Assault Brigade had been dispatched to secure Route 6, which ran
north
from Basra,
through al-Amara and al-Kut, to Baghdad.
•
The al-Faw
Peninsula was “thought to be as secure as possible …
Operations
had
therefore transitioned to PSO – [peace support operations] type
activity,
although
the local population remained very cautious.”
•
3 Commando
Brigade continued to destroy enemy assets on the
peninsula.
CENTCOM
guidance had been changed “to include destruction of
Regime
loyalists
and symbols … to demonstrate commitment to the Iraqi people
…”
265.
The MOD
sought to counter the media focus on the perceived
problems
of the
campaign.
266.
Speaking to
the press on 28 March, Lieutenant General William
Wallace,
Commander
of US V Corps, said that it was beginning to look as if the removal
of the
Iraqi
Government was likely to take longer than originally
thought.160
Lt Gen
Wallace
told reporters:
“The enemy
we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed
against,
because of
these paramilitary forces … We knew they were here, but we did
not
know how
they would fight.”
158
Minute
Williams to PJHQ Dep Hd Pol/Ops(ME), 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Basrah –
Coalition
Campaign Strategy’.
159
Minutes, 28
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
160
New York
Times, 28 March
2003, A Nation at
War: In the Field – V Corps Commander: A Gulf
Commander
Sees a Longer Road.
45