12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
802.
A JIC
Assessment on sectarianism in Iraq on 5 April stated:
“The MNF
and Iraqi security forces (ISF) have been able to constrain only
some
of the
violence. After the Samarra mosque bombing, MNF reporting indicated
the
Iraqi Army
proved effective in many areas, deploying in numbers to protect
both
Sunni and
Shia mosques. Some local police units also performed well, although
the
Ministry of
the Interior (MOI) itself was sluggish in its response. The
imposition of a
curfew and
a large security force presence probably deterred some violence.
But the
picture is
patchy: in some Shia areas of Baghdad, militias were allowed free
rein.
“The most
focused and disciplined anti‑Sunni campaign is being run by
SCIRI’s
Badr
organisation. Since the formation of the interim government, SCIRI
has
systematically
embedded Badr members and units into the state security
structures,
particularly
the MOI where they control intelligence and some paramilitary
units.
Forces
under the control of the Ministry of Defence, with its close ties
to MNF, have
proved less
penetrable …”750
803.
On 20 April,
Lt Gen Fry, now SBMR‑I, was asked by Mr Blair to give
DOP(I) his
assessment
of the capacity of the Iraqi Army and police, and what impact the
new
government
would have.751
He stated
that progress with the army was relatively positive,
but
progress with the police was less good; the “weakness and sectarian
bias of the
Ministry of
Interior” had “exacerbated” problems. He judged that “the key
challenge …
remained to
bring in the Sunnis”.
804.
In discussion
at DOP(I) the following points were raised:
•
the UK
should not underestimate the sectarian character of the ISF, the
new
government
would need to tackle this issue actively; and
•
the UK had
to be realistic about how possible it would be to
develop
non‑sectarian
forces at that stage in Iraq’s development.
805.
On 15 July
2004, the FCO produced a paper considering the options for
the
commitment
of UK police officers in southern Iraq after handover of
sovereignty to the
IIG.752
The FCO
recommended maintaining current staffing levels until mid‑2005,
which
could mean
extending ArmorGroup’s contract and a further
roulement753
of UK
police
trainers.
That would recognise “that SSR remains a main effort for the UK”
and mirrored
current
MNSTC‑I and CPATT projections on the completion of IPS training.
The paper
noted that
“the UK would have a diminishing influence if we were to withdraw
before IPS
training
was complete”.
750
JIC
Assessment, 5 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Sectarianism’.
751
Minutes, 20
April 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
752
Paper FCO,
15 July 2004, ‘Iraq Southern Provinces – Future UK Civilian Police
Commitment’.
753 A
roulement is the deployment of forces, especially for short periods
of duty.
237