The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
11.
Section 1.1
addresses the UK’s review of its strategy on Iraq in May
1999.
The review
concluded that, despite the difficulties in sustaining the
strategy:
“Containment
… remains the only viable option for achieving our policy
objectives.”12
12.
In April 2000,
the JIC judged that it was likely that Iraq was continuing to
develop
offensive
biological and chemical warfare capabilities (see Section
4.1).13
13.
In June 2000,
as part of a “continuing series of papers addressing Iraqi
issues”,
the JIC
assessed Iraq’s response to the NFZs.14
14.
The JIC stated
that Iraq continued to challenge coalition patrols of the NFZs. In
the
preceding
year, Iraq had concentrated on using anti-aircraft artillery and
highly mobile
surface-to-air
missile systems and rockets to fire at US and UK aircraft “on most
days
they flew”.
The capability of Iraq’s air and air-defence forces was “limited”
but there was
a
“continuing, albeit small, risk” of losing an
aircraft.
15.
The JIC judged
that if Saddam Hussein decided to co-operate with UN
Security
Council
resolution (UNSCR) 1284 (1999), he would, in return, seek the
abolition
of the
NFZs.
16.
On 22
September, a French civilian aircraft flew from Paris to Baghdad
without the
UN
Sanctions Committee’s approval.15
The Box
below addresses the background to and
implications
of that flight.
17.
The FCO set
out the Government’s position in a telegram to the British
Embassy
Moscow on 3
October:
“The legal
position on flights is not clear but our position, based on past
practice
relating to
SCRs 661 and 670, is that approval for all flights to Iraq must be
sought
from the
Sanctions Committee and is granted on humanitarian grounds only
…
EC
[European Commission] Regulations prohibit flights from the EU
[European
Union]
which do not have Security Council approval. Others challenge this
legal
interpretation
and claim that the resolutions do not prohibit civilian flights. A
number
of
countries led by France and Russia have recently allowed aircraft
to fly to
Baghdad
without Committee approval (and in the case of France, in clear
breach
of the EC
regulation). We are likely to begin discussion in the P5 soon on a
revised
Security
Council position. It would strengthen our hand in the debate if we
could
stem the
flow of non-approved flights to Iraq. Above all, we must resist a
resumption
of
commercial flights which would be a far greater challenge to our
position and to
the
sanctions regime than the present flurry of non-commercial
flights.”16
12
Joint
Memorandum Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
and the Secretary of State
for
Defence, 17 May 1999, ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.
13
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2000, ‘Iraq: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Programmes’.
14
JIC
Assessment, 28 June 2000, ‘Iraq: No let up in the No-Fly
Zones’.
15
Minute FCO
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 22 September 2000, ‘Iraq: French
Flight’.
16
Telegram
FCO London to Moscow, 3 October 2000, ‘Iraq: Flights’.
192