4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
unreliable”.
The “major downside to this approach” was that the media would
“seize on
the more
vague formulation to suggest that the Government has misled the
public for the
past three
years in talking up the Iraqi WMD threat”.
463.
To defend the
new figures, the FCO suggested the answer should
state:
“These
figures represent our latest assessment. This assessment is subject
to
continual
review … The changes we have made do not alter our view on the
scale of
the Iraqi
WMD threat. Indeed, they reinforce our judgement that Iraq’s
chemical and
biological
capabilities are substantial and a very real danger to the region
and the
wider
world. We shall be releasing further material about this threat in
due course.”
464.
In a
manuscript comment on the submission to Mr Straw,
Mr Dowse confirmed he
had agreed
the minute which would “clear the way for release of the ‘WMD
dossier’ –
but whether
and when to do that awaits a separate decision”.201
465.
Mr McKane’s
meeting on 26 April was informed that the FCO had
sought
Mr Straw’s
views on an inspired PQ to “bring our public statements on
chemical
weapons
numbers into line with the latest DIS estimates”.202
466.
Mr Straw
agreed the recommended approach but asked that the answer
should
explicitly
draw attention to the fact that the figures had been revised, and
that he was
correcting
the estimates in an answer he had given during oral questions on 12
March.203
467.
Mr Straw
also asked that press notice should be issued immediately after
the
answer, “so
that no-one can accuse us of concealing this”.
468.
The revised
estimates were published in a Written Answer from
Mr Straw
469.
In April
the Iraq dossier was expanded to include material on human
rights
and a
history of weapons inspections.
470.
Mr McKane
told the Inquiry, “In April it was decided that we should work on a
group
of papers”,
not “simply a document about weapons of mass
destruction”.205
These
were
worked on
until June “when it was decided to put them on ice”.
471.
In response to
a request from Mr Blair for a paper on Saddam Hussein’s record
of
human
rights abuses, which might be published alongside the WMD paper,
Mr McKane
had sent
Mr Rycroft the material which had been prepared by the FCO for
use by
201
Manuscript
comment Dowse on Minute FCO
[junior official] to Dowse and PS [FCO], 23 April
2002,
‘Iraqi WMD:
Public Dossier’.
202
Letter Dodd
to Gray, 26 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.
203
Minute
Sedwill to FCO [junior official], 30 April 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public
Dossier’.
204
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 2 May
2002, columns 929-930W.
205
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 74.
97