3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
689.
In a speech on
reintegrating Iraq into the international community at
Chatham
House on 21
February, Mr Straw focused on the threat which Saddam Hussein
posed
to the
people of Iraq and the moral case for action.195
690.
Mr Straw
stated that there was international unity about the objective of
disarming
Saddam
Hussein who posed “a unique threat to international peace and
security”.
But “with
each passing year” of Iraq’s defiance, there had “been a growing
awareness
of the
immense consequences of a failure to match our words with actions”,
and:
“The stakes
could not be higher. If the UN proves unable to act on the spirit
and
the letter
of mandatory Chapter VII resolutions when faced with the most
egregious
non-compliance
it risks joining its predecessor, the League of Nations, as a
footnote
in history.”
691.
Mr Straw
said that, without military pressure on Iraq, there would be
“no
co‑operation;
no inspections”. Mr Straw also stated that the threat of
military action
was “and
always has been, about pressuring Saddam Hussein to comply
with
resolution 1441”.
692.
In preparation
for visits to key capitals to pursue support for the UK’s
position,
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, informed Sir David Manning
that a script
was being
prepared which would:
“… briefly
summarise evidence and judgements on Saddam’s WMD, describe
the
effect of
some of the agents; set out the Iraqi response to UNSCR 1441,
including
the flaws
in the 7 December declaration; and cover what we know of
concealment,
intimidation
of witnesses and other aspects of non-co-operation. It will also
provide
supporting
material on Saddam’s regime and – briefly – on links with
terrorism.
We will
update the pack as new material becomes available.”196
693.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that, during a briefing for E10
representatives
in New York
on 21 February, he had made clear that the UK viewed war as a
last
resort, but
the objective of disarming Iraq had to be achieved and the threat
could not
be allowed
to continue for much longer. Verified disarmament had not happened;
and
no-one had
explained how inspections could work without Iraq’s co-operation.
The UK
supported
the UN as a relevant international body, and did not favour
unilateral action.
Sir Jeremy
stated:
“We had to
factor in the US determination to deal with Iraq … [The UK
was]
prepared to
work with the E10 members to achieve a unified Council keeping
the
pressure on
Saddam and perhaps allowing him to crack.”197
195
The
National Archives, 21 February 2003, Reintegrating
Iraq into the International Community –
A cause
with ‘compelling moral force’.
196
Minute
Miller to Manning, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing Foreign
Government’.
197
Telegram
294 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 21
February’.
301