The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Commission,
rescinding all exemptions granted under CPA Order No.1 and
extending
the ban on
public employment to wider involvement in public
life.106
119.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported on 6 November that the transfer of
responsibility:
“… worried
regional commanders in the Sunni Triangle area. They
expressed
particular
concern about the security implications of another round of
dismissals in
the public
sector and the knock‑on impact. General Odierno put it bluntly:
decisions
from
Baghdad that alienated local populations led to his soldiers
getting killed.”107
120.
Having read
Sir Jeremy’s message, the IPU’s view was that the decision to
hand
full
control of de‑Ba’athification to the GC “could result in further
instability … we would
wish to see
a more pragmatic approach”.108
121.
Reporting from
Baghdad, Sir Jeremy wrote that he continued to urge a
flexible
approach to
de‑Ba’athification.109
His
messages indicate that Ambassador Bremer
agreed with
this, though “the IGC wanted tougher
de‑Ba’athification”.
122.
In late
November, the head of the Iraqi National Movement, Mr Hatim
Mukhlis,
told Sir Jeremy
that the de‑Ba’athification policy and disbanding the Iraqi Army
had
been mistakes:
“Rather
than de‑Ba’athification … Iraq needed a truth and reconciliation
committee.
The Ba’ath
Party has been a career route for many people. Those who
had
committed
atrocities or crimes had to be held to account. But many members
were
intellectuals
and professionals. What was required was time for wounds to heal,
but
the
opposite was happening, and this was being exacerbated by militia
activity. The
CPA could
exert pressure on the IGC and influence the de‑Ba’athification
process,
123.
According to
the RAND report Occupying
Iraq, on 9
December Ambassador
Bremer:
“… informed
all CPA civilians and Coalition military personnel,
‘de‑Ba’athification is
now an
Iraqi process … immediately cease any involvement in
de‑Ba’athification’.”111
106
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
107
Telegram
252 IraqRep to FCO London, 6 November 2003, ‘Iraq Regional
Coordinators and
Commanders
Meeting’.
108
Minute
King‑Smith to Buck, 7 November 2003, ‘Iraq: CPA Strategic
Plan’.
109
Telegram
176 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 November 2003, ‘Iraq; Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s Call on Bremer’.
110
Email
Alkadiri [ORHA] to FCO [junior official], 24 November 2003,
‘Sir Jeremy Greenstock and David
Richmond’s
meeting with Hatim Mukhlis (CEO‑Iraqi National Movement) 21
November, 2003’.
111
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
26