The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
999.
On 12
December, Maj Gen Dutton submitted his Hauldown Report to
AM Torpy.926
He wrote
that the threat from IEDs had “radically affected our freedom of
manoeuvre and
consequently
inhibited” SSR work (see Section 14.1 for detail on the IED
threat).
1000.
On the Iraqi
Army, Maj Gen Dutton reported:
“The
development of the Iraqi Army is the ‘jewel in the crown’ of our
SSR effort and
we must not
let up now. The MiTT [Military Transition Team] system has been
a
great
success … their contribution to the ‘conceptual’ and ‘moral’
development of
10th
Division has been enormous … I acknowledge the desire to shift
responsibility
to the
Iraqis themselves to prevent over‑dependence, but the structure is
built on
‘foundations
of sand’ and will require support for some time yet.”
1001.
On the IPS,
Maj Gen Dutton wrote:
“I have
written more than enough on this. I believe that, over time, the
IPS can
be reformed
to an acceptable level, but there is no simple quick solution,
which
is,
I sense, what London wants. In fact, it will be a long hard
slog and will need
unwavering
commitment. The one critical point I must stress is that the UK
should
never again
expect to be able to undertake police restructuring and reform in
this
sort of
environment using UK police: they do not have the institutional
structure or
expertise
to cope, nor can they be compulsorily deployed.”
1002.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Dutton said:
“We had
some excellent policemen but simply not sufficient to take on the
role of
police
training, which is why it had to be done in … a very poor way, but
as best we
could, by
the military.”927
1003.
Lt
Gen Dutton said that there was “nothing wrong” with the
policemen, “there just
weren’t
enough of them”.928
He
continued:
“My
criticism of the UK’s policing – expeditionary policing effort has
never been
aimed at
the individual policemen who do it, simply the fact that I don’t
believe
we, in the
UK, have a system for expeditionary policing that will work in the
sort of
environment
of Iraq or Afghanistan.”
1004.
On 21
December, AM Torpy wrote to Lt Gen Fry to highlight the key
issues
for
2006.929
On the
police he reiterated the need to “maintain momentum and
our
commitment,
pushing ahead quickly with any new work recommended by
Ronnie
Flanagan”.
He then drew attention to Maj Gen Dutton’s Hauldown
Report and stated:
“Jim
[Maj Gen Dutton] has hit the nail on the head and we must
not repeat this painful
mistake in
Afghanistan.”
926
Minute
Dutton to Torpy, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 –
Hauldown Report’.
927
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 20.
928
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 21‑22.
929
Minute CJO
to DCDS(C), 21 December 2005, ‘Key Operational Issues for Early
2006’.
284